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Summary 
The Ostend Company (1722-1731) is a symbol of present-day Belgium’s strangling by European Great 
Power politics in the Ancien Régime, and more specifically of the limitations imposed on the Southern 
Netherlands by the Dutch Republic in 1648. The present contribution analyses the right of Emperor 
Charles VI to send out ships to the East Indies. Pamphlets by Abraham Westerveen and Jean Barbeyrac, 
argued for the exclusion of the Southern Netherlands based on the Treaty of Munster. Against this, 
Patrice de Neny and Jean du Mont invoked the peremptory character of the natural law-rules governing 
free trade. However, the Treaty of Commerce concluded between Charles VI and Philip V, King of Spain, 
on 1 May 1725, constituted a strong basis to refute the Dutch attacks. Yet, norm hierarchy between the 
balance of power inscribed in the Peace of Utrecht and secondary bilateral treaties between sovereigns 
dominated multilateral diplomacy after 1713 and prejudiced the “Belgian” East India trade. 
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Introduction2 
[Les Nations] les plus prudentes cherchent à se procurer par des Traités, les sécours & les avantages, que la Loi Naturelle 
leur assureroit, si les pernicieux conseils d’une fausse Politique ne la rendoient inefficace. 
Vattel, Le Droit des Gens3 
Concerning the OSTEND COMPANY […] DELENDA EST HAEC CARTHAGO 
The Importance of the Ostend-Company consider’d, 17264 
In Belgian historiography, the Imperial East India Company created in Ostend (1722-1731) is often 
presented as an example of the sorry fate the Southern Netherlands had to suffer from the Dutch Revolt 
to the end of the French Revolutionary Wars5. Politically relegated to the status of but one of several 
                                                          
1 Abbreviations used in this article : CUD (Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens, see footnote 
6) ; NA (National Archives), SP (State Papers Foreign) (see footnote 190) ; AMAE (Archives du Ministère des 
Affaires Étrangères et Européennes), CP (Correspondance Politique), M&D (Mémoires et Documents) (see 
footnote 192). 
2 The present article has been presented in an earlier stage to the Dutch-Belgian Study Group for the 
Reception of Roman Law at Leiden University on 21 October 2011. My thanks go to the audience for their remarks 
on my initial ideas, as well as to Dirk Heirbaut, Georges Martyn, Rik Opsommer, Magnus Ressel and Klaas Van 
Gelder, who commented on a later version of the draft. 
3 Emer DE VATTEL, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle Appliqués à la Conduite & aux Affaires des 
Nations & des Souverains. Ouvrage qui conduit à developer les veritables Interêts des Puissances, Leide, Aux dépens de la 
Compagnie, 1758, 2e éd., Book II, § 152. 
4 The Importance of the Ostend-Company consider’d, London: Roberts, 1726, p. 52. 
5 E.g. “La Belgique, sacrifiée sans pitié lors d’une négociation dont elle avait été exclue, se trouvait quasi 
étranglée, en attendant de devenir le champ de bataille de l’Europe”; Georges-Henri DUMONT, L’Épopée de la 
Compagnie d’Ostende 1723-1727, Bruxelles, Le Cri, 2000, p. 10. 
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dominions ruled by a far-away monarch, economically strangled on the conditions of the Treaties of 
Munster6, the former “staple of Europe” with cities as Antwerp, Malines, Brussels or Ghent had become a 
dormant territory in the heart of Europe, and nothing more than the privileged battlefield for first-rank 
powers such as France, Spain and Austria, Britain or the Dutch Republic.  
The present contribution argues the fate of the Ostend Company was not a bilateral quarrel between 
North and South, dictated by anonymous or coincidental arrangements between Great Powers7, 
symbolising the triumph of Realpolitik over principles of natural law8. A reductionist view of the Ostend 
conflict ignores the European structure of international relations. On the one hand, the combination of 
political events and the Dutch Republic’s own legal logic offered a possibility for “Belgian” trade with the 
East Indies to flourish. On the other hand, explaining the Company’s demise by the Emperor’s desire to 
see his daughters succeed him in the Habsburg hereditary lands, is only a fragmentary explanation. The 
predominance of an international guarantee for his “Pragmatic Sanction” was not a mere chimera pursued 
by Charles VI9, but a consequence of a quest for international legitimacy shared by the main actors10, and 
of the changing legal discourse of the Peace of Utrecht (11 April 171311). To this end, an analysis of 
bilateral legal pamphlet literature12 (I) ought to be complemented with diplomatic correspondence and the 
operation of international law in minds (II) within the European Society of Princes13. 
The commercial enterprises leading to the Ostend Company were launched by Thomas Ray, a naturalised 
Irishman who had landed in Ostend in 1698, joining a growing disparate group of Irish merchants14. Ray 
found financial support in Ghent, Bruges and Dunkirk, to send an Ostend-based ship, the Sint-Mattheus, to 
                                                          
6 Treaty between Philip IV and the States-General, Munster, 30 January 1648, DU MONT DE CARELS-
KROON (ed.), Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens, contenant un recueil des traitez d’alliance, de paix, de treve, de 
neutralité, de commerce, d’échange, de protection & de Garantie, de toutes les Conventions, Transactions, Pactes, Concordats, & autres 
Contrats, qui ont été faits en Europe, depuis le Regne de l’Empereur Charlemagne jusques à present [Further : CUD], The Hague, 
Husson & Levier, 1728 , VI/1, nr. CCXXXI, p. 429-441. 
7 Frans DE PAUW, Het Mare Liberum van Grotius en Pattijn, Brugge, Die Keure, 1960 (Vlaamse Rechtskundige 
Bibliotheek; Nieuwe Reeks), p. 231. 
8 The present contribution is limited to the political and legal discussions around the Company. For 
commercial aspects, I refer to Eduard J. BAELS, De generale keizerlijke en koninklijke Indische Compagnie gevestigd in de 
Oostenrijkse Nederlanden genaamd de Oostendse Compagnie, Oostende, Erel, 1972;  Karel DEGRYSE, “De Oostendse 
Chinahandel (1718-1735), in Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire-Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis, LII (1974), 
Nr. 2, 306-347; John EVERAERT, “Les companies rivales des grandes Compagnies des Indes. Le défi de la 
Compagnie d’Ostende (1715-1745), in Christian BUCHET, Jean MEYER & Jean-Pierre POUSSOU (dir.), La puissance 
maritime. Actes du colloque international tenu à l’Institut Catholique de Paris, 13-15 décembre 2001, Paris, PUPS, 2004, p. 415-
422 ; Jan PARMENTIER, De maritieme handel en visserij in Oostende tijdens de achttiende eeuw : een prosopografische analyse van de 
internationale Oostendse handelswereld, 1700-1794 (diss. doc.), Gent: UGent, 2001, 4 v. ; Michael W. SERRUYS, “Oostende 
en de Generale Indische Compagnie. De opbloei en neergang van een koloniale handelshaven (1713-1740)”, 
Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis XXIV (2005), Nr. 1, p. 43-59. 
9 Henri PIRENNE, Histoire de Belgique, Bruxelles, Lamertin, 1926, V, p. 198: “Personne ne s’intéressait, en 
dehors de Hambourg, à la Compagnie d’Ostende. D’ailleurs les considérations dynastiques commençaient à 
déterminer la politique de l’empereur […] il voulait passionnément assurer sa succession.” 
10 Johannes KUNISCH, Staatsverfassung und Mächtepolitik, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1979 (Historische 
Forschungen; 15), p. 54. See as well Charles INGRAO, “The  Pragmatic  Sanction  and  the Theresian succession: A 
re-evaluation”, in Études danubiennes IX (1993), p. 145-161. 
11 Treaties of Peace between Louis XIV and John V of Portugal, Louis XIV and Frederick William I of 
Prussia, Louis XIV and Queen Anne, Louis XIV and Victor II Amadeus of Savoy, Louis XIV and the States-General, 
11 April 1713, CUD VIII/1, nrs. CLII-CLVII, p. 353-386. 
12 For a broader survey of pamphlets on the Ostend Company, I refer to Kris VAN DER MYNSBRUGGE, De 
pamflettenoorlog rond de Oostendse Compagnie, UGent: Faculty of Arts and Philosophy (master thesis in History), 1999-
2000, p. 68-123 and 175-182. My thanks go to one of the anonymous referees for this article. 
13 Lucien BÉLY, La Société des Princes XVIe-XVIIIe siècle, Paris, Fayard, 1999; Ragnhild HATTON, “Louis XIV 
and his fellow monarchs”, in HATTON (ed.), Louis XIV and Europe, London, Macmillan, 1976, p. 16-59. 
14 PARMENTIER, “The Irish Connection The Irish Merchant Community in Ostend and Bruges during the 
late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” in Eighteenth Century Ireland XX (2005), p. 37. 
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Surate in the East Indies, on 17 June 171415. When the ship left Ostend, the Peace Treaty of Rastatt had 
been concluded three months earlier16. Louis XIV and Charles VI, representing the two main contending 
parties in the conflict over the Spanish Succession (1659-1715), had just put an end to the latest continent-
wide war, which had divided Europe from 1701 on. Charles had been allotted the Spanish Netherlands, or 
the remaining ten provinces loyal to their Habsburg ruler after the split of the XVII Provinces17. During 
the war, as the Imperial candidate for the Spanish throne, Charles had claimed much more than merely the 
territories by the North Sea. The partition of the Spanish inheritance between Charles and the French 
candidate, Philip of Anjou, was, however, inevitable18. Neither the House of Habsburg nor that of 
Bourbon could be allowed to dominate the continent, threatening to engulf the other sovereigns. The 
expedition left before the conclusion of the Treaty of Antwerp on 15 November 171519, which opened 
the way to the effective transfer of the Southern Netherlands to Charles. From 1706 on, effective control 
of most of the “Belgian” provinces had been exercised by the joint Anglo-Dutch occupation forces that 
had driven out those of Louis XIV and his grandson20.  
If the Habsburg claim on Spain had fully succeeded, Charles VI would have ruled over circa the same 
territories as, two centuries earlier, Charles V21. Control of the Burgundian inheritance, which served as 
the building block of Habsburg power in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, was crucial in the 
contest between Charles VI and the new King of Spain, Philip V (1683-1746)22. 
Second, Thomas Ray had all reason to move to a Catholic country. As a naturalised Irishman, he can be 
seen as part of the “Jacobite diaspora”23, which supported the claims of James II, the chased Catholic 
King of England (1633-1701). James fled to France in 1688. The Battle of the Boyne (12 July 1690) 
consolidated the British isles for his rival, William III of Orange (1650-1702). With the installation of 
Georg Ludwig of Hanover (1660-1727) as King of England24 accepted by all major European powers by 
August 1714, the chances of the Stuarts ever returning to the throne were significantly reduced. In order 
                                                          
15 Ibid., p. 38-42. 
16 Peace Treaty between Charles VI and Louis XIV, Rastatt, 6 March 1714, CUD, VIII/1, nr. CLXX, 415-423. 
17 Klaas VAN GELDER, “L'empereur  Charles  VI  et  "l'héritage  anjouin"  dans  les  Pays-Bas  méridionaux  
(1716-1725)”, in Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine LVIII (2011), No. 1, p. 53-79. 
18 Antonio ÁLVAREZ-OSSORIO, Bernardo J. GARCÍA GARCÍA & Virginia LEÓN SANZ (eds.), La guerra de 
Sucesión por la Monarquía de España, Madrid, Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2007; Frederik DHONDT, “From Contract 
to Treaty: The Legal Transformation of the Spanish Succession, 1659-1715”, in Journal of the History of International 
Law-Revue d’histoire du droit international [Further : JHIL] XIII (2011), No. 2, 347-374; Marie-Françoise MAQUART, Le 
réseau français à la cour de Charles II d’Espagne : jeux diplomatiques de fin de règne - 1696-1700 (diss. doc.), Villeneuve-d’Asq, 
Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 1999. 
19 Treaty of the Barrier between Charles VI, George I and the States-General, Antwerp, 15 November 1715, 
CUD, VIII/1, nr. CLXXX, p. 458-468. 
20 Reginald DE SCHRYVER, “Who had sovereignty in the Southern Netherlands during the War of the 
Spanish Succession (1700-1715)?”, in X (ed.), Liber amicorum Jan Buntinx. Recht en instellingen in de oude Nederlanden tijdens 
de middeleeuwen en de Nieuwe Tijd, Leuven: Universitaire Pers, 1981, 483-497; VAN GELDER, “De Vooght versus 
Sersanders. De strijd om het presidentschap van de Raad van Vlaanderen en het probleem van de 'Anjouaanse' 
benoemingen in de Oostenrijkse Nederlanden (1716-1725)”, in Pro Memorie. Bijdragen tot de rechtsgeschiedenis der 
Nederlanden, XII (2010), p. 15-35. 
21 LEÓN SANZ, Carlos VI. El Emperador que no pudo ser Rey de España, Madrid, Aguilar, 2003. 
22 E.g. discussions on the Golden Fleece at the Cambrai conference, F. DHONDT, Balance of Power and 
International Law. European Diplomacy and the Elaboration of International Order, 18th Century and Post 1945 (diss. doc.), 
Ghent, UGent, 2013, p. 248-251 (à paraître comme Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy. Franco-British Diplomacy after the 
Peace of Utrecht (1713), Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2015 (Studies in the History of International Law; 7); Elena 
POSTIGA-O CASTELLANOS, “El  cisma  del  toisón.  Dinastía  y  orden  (1700-1748)”, in Pablo FERNÁNDEZ-
ALBALADEJO (ed.), Los  Borbones.  Dinastía  y  memoria  de  nación  en  la  España  del  Siglo  XVIII,  Madrid: Marcial Pons, 
2001, 331-380; Annemarie WEBER, Der Österreichische Orden vom Goldenen Vliess. Geschichte und Probleme (diss. doc.), 
Bonn, Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, 1971. 
23 Patrick CLARKE DE DROMANTIN, Les réfugiés jacobites dans la France du XVIIIe siècle: l’exode de toute une noblesse 
pour cause de religion, Pessac : Presses universitaires de Bordeaux, 2005. 
24 HATTON, George I, New Haven (Conn.), Yale UP, 2001 [1978] (Yale English Monarchs). 
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to return to Britain, James “III” (1688-1766), son of the deceased Catholic monarch, could only hope for a 
continental and Catholic coalition against Britain. To this effect, his supporters actively lobbied the courts 
of Versailles, Madrid and Rome25. It should come as no surprise that a first series of British statutes 
against the Ostend enterprise were issued on 17 March 1714 and 18 October 17126. The Jacobite network 
was not only political, but also commercial. It spanned the continent and was important for trade between 
Spain, Portugal, France and Britain27. Nine out of ten members of the officer’s council on the Sint-Mattheus 
were of Irish origin28. In the future Ostend Company’s ventures, one sailor out of five29. 
The scene seemed set for a classical opposition between the Protestant Maritime Powers and one of the 
two Catholic monarchs in Versailles or Vienna. After Louis XIV’s decease in September 1715, Britain was 
busy negotiating a new deal with Charles VI, involving Italy and the recognition of the Emperor’s 
succession30.  The 1715 Barrier Treaty31 between the Maritime Powers and Charles VI was set up as a 
safeguard against French invasion, in order to prevent the scenario of the previous wars32. Direct French 
aggression against the Dutch Republic had to be rendered impossible, thanks to the occupation of a string 
of fortresses, paid for by Charles VI 33. 
Yet, a decisive combination of issues caused George I to change sides and abandon his reconciliation with 
the Emperor. In France, Louis XIV’s death had opened the way for a Regency, assumed  by the Duke of 
Orléans (1674-1723), cousin to the late Sun King. France’s regime was a matter of consensus between the 
remaining court parties34. Philip of Orléans had all advantage in keeping out Philip of Anjou, Louis XIV’s 
second grandson, who ruled in Spain since 1700. As King of Spain, Philip V did not want to abandon the 
dream to return to Versailles and claim the crown. He challenged the validity of the British-imposed 
                                                          
25 Basil WILLIAMS, Stanhope: A Study in Eighteenth-Century War and Diplomacy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1932, 
p. 212-213. 
26 Dates refer to the Old Style or Julian calendar, used in Britain until 1756. Gerald B. HERTZ, “England 
and the Ostend Company”, in English Historical Review [further: EHR] XXII (1907), No. 86 (Apr), p. 255-279. 
27 PARMENTIER, “The Irish Connection”, op. cit., p. 53. 
28 Ibid., p. 41. 
29 Ibid., p. 42. 
30 Theo  GEHLING, Ein englischer Diplomat am Kaiserhof zu Wien, François Louis de  Pesne, Seigneur de Saint-
Saphorin, als englischer Resident am Wiener Hof, 1718-1727, Bonn, Röhrscheid Verlag, 1964 (Bonner historische 
Forschungen. Bd. 25) p. 119, 123; Derek MCKAY,  Allies  of  convenience:  diplomatic  relations  between  Great  Britain  and  
Austria,  1714-1719,  New  York,  Garland, 1986 (Outstanding  theses  from  the  London  School  of  Economics  
and  Political  Sciences). In the line of the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV, George I’s enthronization as British 
monarch could be seen as a sign of a stronger Austro-British relationship. Georg Ludwig had supported Charles’ 
claims to the Spanish inheritance and continued the struggle at the Emperor’s side after the British defected from the 
Alliance (HATTON, Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, 1714-1721, London, East and West, 
1950). 
31 Traité entre Charles VI. Empereur des Romains & Roi Catholique des Espagnes d’une part, George Roi 
de la Grande-Bretagne & les Seigneurs Etats Generaux des Provinces-Unies des Païs-Bas, d’autre part, pour la 
Restitution, à sa Majesté Impériale & Catholique de tout le Païs-Bas Espagnol, sous la reserve d’une forte & solide 
Barrière aux mêmes Païs-Bas en faveur de Leurs Hautes Puissances, Antwerp, 15 November 1715, CUD, VIII/1, nr. 
CLXXX, p. 458-468. 
32 Thirty Years War (1635), War of Devolution (1667), Dutch War (1672), War of the Réunions (1683), 
Nine Years’ War (1688) and War of the Spanish Succession (1701). See John A. LYNN, The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-
1714, London, Longman, 1999 (Modern wars in perspective). 
33 A sum amounting to a third of the Southern Netherlands’ annual budget (VAN GELDER, Tien jaar Trial 
and Error ? De opbouw van het Oostenrijks bewind in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden (1716-1725) (diss. doc.), Gent, UGent, 2012, 
p. 145). 
34 Alexandre DUPILET, La Régence absolue: Philippe d’Orléans et la polysynodie, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 2011 
(Époques); Emmanuel LE ROY LADURIE, Saint-Simon ou le Système de la Cour, Paris, le grand livre du mois, 1998. 
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declaration of renunciation to the French throne35. Consequently, Philip of Orléans’ political fate 
depended on the Treaties of Utrecht36.   
On the other side of the Channel, George I’s position as King of Great Britain was guaranteed 
internally by the Act of Settlement. However, James III’s supporters denied the legal validity of 
Parliament’s chasing James II in 1688, which only intervened after an invasion by the Dutch37. Thus, 
George I needed an international back-up too, which could be found in the recognition of the Protestant 
Succession in Britain, as expressed in the Treaties of Rijswijk and Utrecht38. George I was  King of Great 
Britain, but a German Elector as well.  As Duke of Hanover, he saw his interests compromised in 
Northern Germany. Emperor Charles VI delayed the issuing of letters of investiture for the acquisition of 
the duchies of Bremen and Verden. Moreover, in the Great Northern War, a conflict dragging on since 
170039, George had fought Sweden, but feared an alliance between Russia, Sweden, Spain and Pretender 
James III. When Czar Peter the Great (1672-1725) stationed  40 000 troops in the Duchy of Mecklenburg,  
bordering on Hanover40,  Dubois’ offer of an alliance with France was finally accepted. George I and his 
principal minister James Stanhope (1673-1721) opted for France in November 171641.  This fundamentally 
altered the whole of European politics, “North” and “South” combined. 
The Anglo-French alliance, elaborated in the Summer and Fall of 1717, obtained Dutch accession, in the 
so-called Triple Alliance of 4 January 171742. The Dutch Republic guaranteed Britain’s and France’s choice 
to discard constitutionally legitimate heirs to the throne43. This new combination tied three previously 
unlikely partners together and left the Emperor aloof of three big powers neighbouring his possessions in 
the Southern Netherlands. When Philip V of Spain invaded Charles VI’s island Sardinia, barely six months 
later, the Dutch steered an independent course and let the multilateral intervention to France and Britain. 
Dutch absence in the so-called Quadruple Alliance44 (where the Republic’s place was left open, to be 
never filled) implied Dutch absence at the Congress of Cambrai (1722-1725), designed to settle the quarrel 
between Philip V and Charles VI.  
                                                          
35 Philip V had to renounce his rights before signing the Peace Treaty at Utrecht, text : Declaration of Philip 
V, Madrid, 3 July 1712, CUD, VIII/1, nr. CXXXI, 304. Alfred BAUDRILLART, “Examen des droits de Philippe V et de 
ses descendants au trône de France, en dehors des renonciations  d'Utrecht”, in Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique III 
(1889), p. 161-191 & 354-384; ID., Philippe V et la cour de France: d'après des documents inédits tirés des archives espagnoles de 
Simancas et d'Alcala de Hénarès et des Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères à Paris, Paris, Didot, 1890, 5 v. 
36 Which provided his own Bourbon-Orléans branch with a remote possibility to claim the crown if Louis 
XV came to die without male issue (See Émile BOURGEOIS, La Diplomatie secrète au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, Armand Collin, 
1909, I). 
37 Jonathan ISRAEL, The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477-1806, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988², 
p. 452. 
38 Art. IV, Treaty of Peace between Louis XIV and Queen Anne, Utrecht, 11 April 1713, CUD, VIII/1, nr. 
CLI, p. 340. 
39 Erik SCHNAKENBOURG, La France, le Nord et l’Europe au début du XVIIIe siècle, Paris, Champion, 2008 
(Bibliothèque d’histoire moderne et contemporaine; 26). 
40 Manfred HELLMANN, “Die Friedensschlüsse von Nystad (1721) und Teschen (1779) als Etappen des  
Vordringens Russlands nach Europa”, in Historisches Jahrbuch XCVII/XCVIII (1978), p. 270-288. 
41 Robert Walpole and Charles Townshend quit cabinet (the so-called “Whig Split”), but would continue a 
pro-French and anti-Imperial policy after Stanhope’s decease allowed them to return to government in 1721 (John 
Joseph MURRAY, George  I,  the  Baltic  and  the  Whig  Split  of  1717.  A  Study  in  Diplomacy  and  Propaganda, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).  The link between Jacobitism and foreign policy was further exploited by Stanhope, 
when the Swedish ambassador Gyllenborg was arrested (29 January 1717) on rumours of a plot threatening the 
Protestant Succession (DHONDT, Balance of Power, p. 72-78).  
42 Treaty between Louis XV, George I and the States-General, The Hague, 4 January 1717, CUD VIII/1, nr. 
CLXXXVI, p. 484-488. 
43 “Contre  les  partisans  de  la  légitimé  royale,  le  Régent passait un contrat avec les partisans du droit des 
peuples, avec les pays républicains”, BOURGEOIS, Diplomatie secrète, p. 173-174. 
44 Treaty between Charles VI, Louis XV and George I, London, 2 August 1718, CUD VIII/2, nr. CCII, p. 531-
541. 
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Consequently, whereas the Maritime Powers had been united in 1715 for the status of the Southern 
Netherlands, Britain went with France, as it had done before at the end of 1711, when separate Franco-
British peace preliminaries showed the blueprint for the end of the War of the Spanish Succession45. A 
major element of tension in European international relations during Louis XIV’s reign, the opposition 
between France and the Protestant Maritime Powers46, was relegated to the background. The application, 
interpretation and amending of the Peace of Utrecht united French and British diplomats47. 
The consequences for the status of the Austrian Netherlands were considerable. On the basis of the 
abovementioned diplomatic movements, Charles VI obtained leverage on Britain and the Dutch Republic. 
In order to solve a problem at the European table, French involvement was indispensable.  As long as 
Charles remained in a deadlock with Philip V of Spain, France and Britain could make any concession 
towards the Emperor conditional on his acceptance of the broader diplomatic framework imposed by the 
Peace of Utrecht. Once Charles and Philip would have solved their bilateral issues, they could try to 
challenge the new consensus between the main power at sea, Britain, and the main land power, France. 
While the main powers in Europe were rapidly changing their positions, trade in Ostend continued: on 30 
August 1716, the Saint-Mathieu returned from Surate on the Indian West coast and generated enormous 
profits for its initial investors. 
Bilateral restraints: self-interest and opportunistic argumentation 
Le Commerce est naturellement jaloux, & interessé. Comme son objet prochain, & immediat est le gain, & qu’on ne 
l’entreprend jamais, que pour gagner, c’est aussi toujours de ce coté là que se tourne la principale attention de ceux, qui s’en 
mêlent. 
Du Mont, La Vérité, 35-3648 
The Dutch Republic and its East India Company (VOC49) questioned the legitimacy of the Ostend trade, 
and were eventually prepared to use force to compel Charles VI 50. Already on 27 April 1719, the Marquis 
de Prié was confiscated at Cape Lahou, forty miles ahead of the Dutch fortress Laxim and thus well off the 
African coast51. On 4 July of the same year, sales of tea shipped to Ostend from Canton by the Prince 
Eugène alone amounted to a million florins. Determined not to let the seizure of the Marquis de Prié pass, 
captain De Winter took the Dutch yacht Commany, filled with African elephant teeth, on 23 October 1719 
                                                          
45 Preliminaries of Peace between Louis XIV and Queen Anne, London, 8 October 1711, CUD, nr. CXIX, 
VIII/1, p. 281.  BELY, Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV, Paris, Fayard, 1990, p. 576-595; DHONDT, 
“L'équilibre européen et la Succession d'Espagne. L'épisode révélateur des négociations de Nicolas Mesnager en 
Hollande, 1707-1708”, in Véronique DEMARS-SION et al. (dir.), Diplomates et Diplomatie. Actes des Journées Internationales 
tenues à Péronne du 22 au 23 mai 2009, Lille, Université Lille 2-Centre d'histoire judiciaire, 2013 (Société d'Histoire du 
Droit et des Institutions des Pays Flamands, Picards et Wallons), p. 97-112. 
46 Charles-Édouard LEVILLAIN, Vaincre Louis XIV: Angleterre, Hollande, France, histoire d’une relation triangulaire 
1665-1668, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 2010 (Époques). 
47 DHONDT, “Legal Discourse between Integration and Disintegration: The Case of the Peaceful Succession 
Struggles, 1713-1739”, in Janwillem OOSTERHUIS & Emanuel VAN DONGEN (eds.), European Traditions: Integration or 
Disintegration ?, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2013, p. 159-174. 
48 DU MONT DE CARELS-KROON, La Vérité du fait, du droit, et de l’intérêt de tout ce qui concerne le commerce des Indes 
établi aux Païs Bas Autrichiens par octroi de Sa Majesté Imper. Et Catholique, s.l., s.n., 1726, p. 35-36. 
49 On its legal structure, Matthijs DE JONGH, Tussen societas en universitas. De beursvennootschap en haar 
aandeelhouders in historisch perspectief (diss. doc), Rotterdam, Erasmus University, 2014, p. 59-131. 
50 Victor ENTHOVEN, “Dan maar  oorlog!  De reactie  van  de  Republiek op  de Oostendse  Compagnie, 
1715-1732”, in PARMENTIER (ed.), Noord-Zuid in Oost-Indisch Perspectief, Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2005, p. 131-148. The 
threat to use force was not only directed at the Emperor, but at potential investors as well. E.g. on 9 August 1723, a 
thousand copies of the VOC’s memorandum was printed and distributed in Antwerp, were substantial capital had 
been raised for the Company (Michel HUISMAN, La Belgique commerciale sous l'empereur Charles VI : la Compagnie d'Ostende: 
étude historique de politique commerciale et coloniale, Bruxelles, Lamertin, 1902, p. 240). 
51 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 22. 
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off the Belgian coast, an action approved by the Council of State in Brussels52. Southern Netherlanders 
founded trade posts on the Coromandel coast and in Bangladesh. Emperor Charles VI formalised the 
enterprise, now operating as a joint stock corporation, granting its formal permission on 19 December 
172253. Few months later, on 5 April 1723, the Dutch resident Pesters presented memoranda drafted by 
the States-General and the VOC (drafted by their avocat, de la Bassecourt) to the Marquis of Prié54. 
Simultaneously, Hamel Bruynincx (1661-1738), envoy of the Republic in Vienna, presented the same texts 
to Charles VI55. In essence, Dutch argumentation constituted a 180 degree turn away from Grotius’ 
famous seventeenth-century stand for free navigation on the high seas in De Iure Praedae56. Whereas the 
famous jurist had argued that neither the Kings of Spain and Portugal57,  nor the King of England, could 
claim the exclusion of the Dutch from the ranks of the seafaring nations, the interests of the Republic 
were better served by the opposite point of view, a century later. 
The Dutch East India Company and her legal weapons 
Two more substantial, separately published treatises represent the Dutch vituperations against Ostend. 
Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744)58, professor of Public Law at Groningen, and Abraham Westerveen (°1647), 
former lawyer for the East India Company, attacked the Imperial Company with arguments from treaty 
law59. The Peace Treaty of Munster between Spain and the Dutch Republic, concluded in 1648, 
constituted the core of Dutch pamphlets. Philip IV, at that time King of Spain, Duke of Brabant, Count of 
Flanders, Lord of Malines and sovereign in the remaining provinces left to him by Charles V, Philip II  
(1527-1598) and Philip III (1578-1621), conceded to the Seven Provinces of the North on multiple points. 
First, final recognition of the statehood assumed by the former Spanish provinces. Second, recognition of 
their colonial and commercial expansion. Finally, exclusion of his own subjects from trade in the Indies.  
It was crucial for the VOC to prove that these limitations had been transmitted from Philip IV and his 
successor Charles II to Charles VI, who had been recognised as sovereign in the Southern Netherlands by 
Britain and the Dutch Republic in the Treaty of the Grand Alliance60. This document constituted the core 
                                                          
52 Marquis de Prié to Charles VI, Report on his administration of the Southern Netherlands, 16 April 1725, 
published in Louis Prosper GACHARD (ed.), Collection de documents inédits concernant l’histoire de la Belgique, Bruxelles, 
Louis Hauman & Cie, 1835, III, p. 500-502 and p. 504-512. 
53 Lettres Patentes d’Octroi, accordées par l’Empereur Charles VI. pour le terme de trente années à la Compagnie des Indes 
dans les Païs-Bas Autrichiens, Vienna, 19 December 1722, CUD, VIII/2, nr. XIX, p. 44-51. The formalisation of the 
Ostend enterprise should not obscure the abovementioned private initiatives from Ostend or “Flemish” 
participation in e.g. French smuggling trade with the East Indies (DEGRYSE, “De vrienden van ‘Mijnheer Crozat’ of 
de Zuid-Nederlandse betrokkenheid bij de Franse handel op de Stille Zuidzee (1710-1719)”, in PARMENTIER & S. 
SPANOGHE (eds.), Orbis in Orbem. Liber Amicorum John Everaert, Gent, Academia Press, 2001, p. 157-170. 
54 E.g. Memorandum presented by Ernst Pesters, resident of the States-General in Brussels (1717-1728) to 
the Marquis of Prié, Brussels, 5 April 1723, DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 85-87. 
55 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 22.  
56 Robert FEENSTRA & Jeroen VERVLIET (eds.), Hugo Grotius’ Mare Liberum: 1609-2009, Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2009. 
57 Seraphim DE FREITAS, Freitas contre Grotius sur la question de la liberté des mers. Justification de la domination 
portugaise en Asie (trad. Alfred GUICHON DE GRANDPONT), Paris, Gaillard & Cie, 1893. 
58 Not “Barbeyron” (DUMONT, L’épopée de la Compagnie, p. 197). Barbeyrac had been active as a classics 
teacher in Berlin, where he translated Pufendorf’s De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1706) to French. In Lausanne, 
Barbeyrac taught droit et histoire from 1710 to 1717, to be called to Groningen as professor ordinarius in droit public et 
particulier. In 1724, Barbeyrac completed his translation of Grotius’ magnum opus De Iure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, 
following a critical edition in 1720. Barbeyrac’s translations were of paramount importance for diplomatic practice, 
since his French translations were more accessible than the Latin originals.  
59 Abraham WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt, Dat de Vereenigde Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Maatschappye Heeft 
op de Vaart en Koophandel Naar Oost-Indiën; Tegen de Inwoonders van de Spaanse, nu de Oostenrykse Nederlanden, Amsterdam, 
Johannes de Ruyter, 1722. See as well, in a shorter version, CUD, VIII/2, nr. XXI, p. 78-80. 
60 Tractatus Foederis inter Sacram Caesaream Majestatem Leopolum I. Regiam Majestatem Britanniae  
Wilhelmum  III.  Necnon  Praepotentes  Ordines  Generales  Foederatarum  Belgii  Provinciarum,  ad  procuandum 
Suae Caesareae Majestati ratione praetensionis suae in Successionem Hispanicam satisfactionem aequam & rationi 
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of the grand coalition against Louis XIV and his grandson Philip V. Charles of Habsburg, at that time 
Archduke and younger brother to Archduke Joseph (1683-1711), King of the Romans (and thus his 
father’s designated successor as Emperor), had been promised nothing more than a just and reasonable 
satisfaction in the Spanish Succession61. This was even more true when Charles was elected Emperor 
himself, after Joseph’s unexpected decease in April 1711. In the Grand Alliance, the Southern Netherlands 
had been identified as the prime bulwark against future French aggression (obex et repagulum, vulgo Barrière). 
The formal recognition of Charles VI’s sovereignty happened at the Treaties of Utrecht (11 April 1713, 
France/Britain) and Rastatt (6 March 1714, France/Emperor), stating that the Southern Netherlands 
would be transferred to the Emperor in the same status they had belonged to Charles II of Spain (tels que 
feu le Roy d’Espagne Charles II. les a possedés ou dû posséder, conformément au Traité de Ryswick62). The Barrier Treaty 
confirmed -in a general way- all relevant trade clauses of the Treaty of Munster63. If the exclusion of all 
Spanish subjects included inhabitants of the Spanish Netherlands, this limitation had to be continued 
under Austrian rule. 
Once this bilateral and conventional argument was accepted, Barbeyrac and Westerveen needed to 
buttress it against challenges stemming from natural law. Didn’t the Digest state that the navigation on the 
high seas, necessary means of communication between nations, was a natural right64 ? Even more, Hugo 
Grotius had famously leaned on this statement to defend Dutch pretentions against Spain and Portugal, a 
century earlier65. The VOC’s advocates turned to the ruse of mare natura liberum, pactis clausum66 (“the sea is 
free by nature, but can be closed by treaties”). Although navigation on the high seas pertained to all 
nations, they could renounce this right merae facultatis in a convention. Renunciations were coupled with 
reciprocal advantages, and would not have been contracted without cause. However, if one assumed the 
opposite position (namely that free navigation on the high seas constituted a peremptory norm of natural 
law, overriding contrary treaties concluded between states), another hot issue in North/South-relations 
resurfaced. The Treaty of Munster had closed (art. XIV) the navigation of the Scheldt and other 
embouchures on the North Sea, which reflected the military state of affairs from early in the Dutch 
Revolt67. Neny68, who defended the Southern Netherlands’ point of view, had put this at the same level as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
convenientem,  uti  &  ad  adipiscendum  pro  Rege  Magnae  Britanniae  &  Dominis  Ordinibus  Generalibus 
securitatem particularem & sufficientem, The Hague, 7 September 1701, CUD, VIII/1, nr. XIII, p. 89-91. 
61 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 49 ; See DHONDT, “Entre droit privé et droit international : la 
succession d’Espagne aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles”, Cahiers du centre de recherches en histoire du droit et des institutions: 
Histoire(s) du droit, dir. Marie MOULART et Emmanuël FALZONE. n°. 35-36 (2011), p. 61-102. 
62 Art. XIX Treaty of Rastatt; BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 13; art. I, Barrier Treaty; WESTERVEEN, 
Vertoog van het regt, op. cit. , p. 8. 
63 Art. XXVI, Barrier Treaty: sur le pié établi, & de la maniére portée par les Articles du Traité fait à Munster le 30. 
Janvier 1648.  
64 VATTEL, Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Book II, § 132: La propriété n’a pu ôter aux Nations le droit général de parcourir 
la terre, pour communiquer ensemble, pour commercer entr’elles, & pour d’autres justes raisons. 
65 Monica BRITO VIEIRIA, “Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden's Debate on 
Dominion over the Seas”, Journal of the History of Ideas LXIV (2003), No. 3 (Jul), p. 361-377. 
66 Theodor GRAVER, Dissertatio juridica inauguralis, de mari natura libero, pactis clauso, Utrecht, Willem vande 
Water, 1728. 
67 HUISMAN, La Belgique commerciale, p. 5. 
68 Patrice DE NENY, Demonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention que les Directeurs de la Compagnie des Indes en 
Hollande forment afin de faire revoquer, ou du moins rendre inutile l’Octroy que Sa Majesté Imperiale & Catholique a accordé à ses 
Sujets des Païs-bas Autrichiens pour l’Etablissement d’une Compagnie de Commerce & de Navigation aux Indes Orientales & 
Occidentales, s.l., s.d., 1724. Patrice de Neny, originally Patrick Mac Neny (1675-1745), studied law at the University of 
Leuven (1691-1702). An avocat at the Council of Brabant (1703), he climbed to the rank of councillor in the Council 
of  Finance (1713) at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. At the 1718-1719 negotiations on the 
amendment of the Barrier Treaty, Neny was sent to The Hague. In 1724, Eugene of Savoy, governor-general of the 
Southern Netherlands, appointed him as Secretary of State and War, a position which he occupied until his death. 
Neny was the main person of confidence for the Marquis of Prié (1658-1726), minister plenipotentiary of Charles VI 
in Brussels. See Bruno BERNARD, “Patrice Mac Neny (1676-1745) Secrétaire d’État et de Guerre”, Études sur le XVIIIe 
siècle XII (1985) (Hervé HASQUIN & Roland MORTIER (eds.), Une famille de hauts fonctionnaires : les Neny), Bruxelles, 
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the supposed renunciation of the Southern Netherlanders’ right to sail to the Indies: un entier renversement 
des Loix du Droit des Gens, parce qu’on y prive toutes les Nations du Monde de la Liberté Naturelle que Dieu Leur a 
donnée, par l’Interdiction qu’on leur a faite d’entrer dans les Provinces de Brabant, & de Flandres avec Leurs propres 
Vaisseaux & Marchandises69.  
Barbeyrac’s Défense du droit de la Compagnie Hollandoise des Indes Orientales appeared on 17 January 1725. By 
then, the Congress of Cambrai had been busy for almost a year. The treatise was framed as a response to 
Neny. Just as with his French translations of Pufendorf70 and Grotius71, Barbeyrac reached a more 
substantial audience in French-speaking Europe than with a treatise in Latin or Dutch, wherein 
Westerveen published his defence of the VOC72. Neny, by contrast, had written in French and thus 
potentially harmed the Dutch case by reaching out wider. Like Westerveen in a second version of his 
Dissertatio, a year earlier73, Barbeyrac offered to correct Neny’s errors, d’éplucher tout, & de ne rien laisser passer, 
qui ne fut une répétition toute pure.  If the Dutch based their defence on the 1648 Treaty of Munster, 
chronological coincidence seemed to be on the Austrian side. Grotius’ major works coincided with 
important evolutions in the Eighty and Thirty Years’ War, the conflicts that ended in 1648. If Grotius 
stated in De Iure Praedae (XII, I-21674) that all peoples equally enjoyed the right to visit other nations and 
carry on their trade, how could this argument of natural law be cast aside by the positive law of nations ?  
As a professor of public law at Groningen and a recognised expert in the law of nations (on the basis of 
his translations, as well as the edition of treaties from Antiquity), Barbeyrac claimed the objectivity of his 
method equalled that of other types of scholarly activity75. In spite of Barbeyrac’s reputation as a 
systematic thinker, he composed a hodgepodge of diverse arguments drawn from any possible source. For 
instance, he took the long delay between the origin of times and 1722 as a sign that the inhabitants of the 
Southern Netherlands forfeited their right to navigation, or implicitly recognized they were under a 
limitation based on the Treaty of Munster76. Barbeyrac, in his defence of the Republic’s exclusive rights, 
even quoted Zypaeus, who defended the claims of the King of Spain on maritime dominium in the 
seventeenth century: Mare non liberum, ut voluit Grotius, sed potius Iberum hodie sit censendum77. 
Primary natural law v. voluntary law of nations 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ULB, 1985, p. 7-78 ; Jacques LEFÈVRE, “NENY (Patrice DE)”, Biographie Nationale de Belgique,  I (fasc. 1), Bruxelles, 
Bruylandt, 1956, p. 406-407 ; VAN GELDER, Tien jaar Trial and Error ?, p. 137-138 and 299-303. 
69 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 42. 
70 Samuel VON PUFENDORF, Les devoirs de l’homme, et du citoien, tels qu’ils lui sont prescrits par la loi naturelle (transl. 
J. Barbeyrac), Amsterdam, Pierre de Coup, 1715³.  
71 Hugo GROTIUS, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix (trad. BARBEYRAC), Amsterdam, De Coup, 1724. 
72 Abraham WESTERVEEN, Dissertatio de Jure, Quod Competit Societati Privilegiatæ Fæderati Belgii Ad Navigationem 
& Commercia Indiarum Orientalium, Adversus Incolas Belgii Hispanici-hodie-Austriaci, Amsterdam, Wetstein, 1722 ; 
BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., Avertissement. 
73 WESTERVEEN, A Second Dissertation Concerning the Right of the Dutch East-India Company To the Trade and 
Navigation of the East-Indies, Against the Inhabitants of the Spanish, now Austrian Netherlands, In Answer to the objections of Mr. 
P. Mac Neny, Counseor & Proc. Fiscal, to His Imperial & Catholick Majesty, The Hague, Johnson, 1724; Dutch version: 
Europische Mercurius XXXV (1724), p. 212-248. 
74 Hoc igitur jus ad cunctas gentes aequaliter pertinet: quod clarissimi jurisconsulti eousque producunt, ut negent ullam 
rempublicam aut Principem prohibere in universum posse, quominus alii ad subditos suos accedant et cum illis negotientur. 
75 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., Avertissement: J’ai examiné les matiéres non seulement avec beaucoup 
d’attention, mais encore avec la méme indifférence & la même impartialité, que si j’avois eû à discuter un point de l’Histoire Ancienne, 
& à chercher, par exemple, le vrai sens d’un Traité fait entre Philippe de Macedoine, & les Athéniens. 
76 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 2. VATTEL (Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Book I, §285) refuted this : 
although any state can decide not to engage in commerce or renounce it on a contractual basis, this implies an act of 
will. In absence of this, prescription (i.e. the mere passage of time) cannot provoke the loss of this faculty. Moreover, 
Du Mont argued that, while under Spanish domination, the Southern Netherlands were deprived of the exercise of 
their legal capacities: Non valenti ageree non currit praescriptio (DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 33). 
77 Franciscus ZYPAEUS, Notitia iuris belgici, Antwerpen, Verdussen, 1635, p. 284. 
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According to Barbeyrac, the VOC’s right to trade and navigate was grounded on Priviléges & Traitez 
solennels qui les lui ont assurez d’une maniére irrevocable par rapport aux Habitans des Païs-Bas Autrichiens78 : by not 
questioning the VOC’s right to sail to the Indies and conversely abstaining from doing the same, Philip 
IV’s and Charles II’s subjects had both forfeited their own right79 and confirmed that of the Dutch. 
Westerveen supported this position leaning on Baldus’ commentary on the Digest, according to whom 
distinctions between states could be applied at sea as well as on land80, on the Church Father Ambrosius 
or John Selden (whose theses had been opposed to those of Grotius in the seventeenth century81). 
Moreover, Spanish state practice to exclude foreign nations from direct commerce with Spain’s colonies in 
the Indies provided the world with clear boundaries, which were an essential precondition to international 
stability82. Finally, the right thus accorded to the Dutch by treaty did not necessarily amount to full 
dominium. In analogy with civil law, real property rights of use or  enjoyment, including the right to exclude 
third party-access, could be granted to states, distinct from property83. 
Barbeyrac tackled the issue of free navigation head-on: Le vaste Océan n’est à personne: d’accord […] Mais qu’est-
ce qui empêche que deux Princes ou deux Peuples conviennent entr’eux, que l’un ne mettra point de Vaisseaux en mer, ou 
qu’il n’en envoiera que jusqu’à un certain endroit de l’Océan, ou de quelque autre Mer moins vaste, ou qu’il n’ira point 
commercer en tel ou tel endroit84 ? In other words, Barbeyrac distinguished between a hard right to navigate, 
and a (soft) possibility to exercise that right, the latter leading to a reliable promise to another sovereign, 
whose consent is needed to recover the initially forfeited right. Mare liberum is thus turned into a 
disposition of supplementary law: mare liberum… pactis clausum. Barbeyrac found a legitimacy for 
renunciation in the general reciprocity between nations: we forfeit our right to navigation “en comptant sur ce 
que les autres veulent à leur tour nous ceder des leurs85.” In the “Belgian” case, Philip IV acted on behalf of his 
territories by the North Sea, and rightly so, as their legitimate sovereign. Philip ratified the treaty as King 
of Castille, Duke of Brabant and Count of Flanders, obliging all of his vassals and subjects alike86. In case 
his subjects would not have consented to the imposition of this limitation, they had to make this known 
within a reasonable lapse of time87. 
Westerveen distinguished between situations leading to an opposable claim on international trade. The 
Dutch trading companies had acquired their exclusive right to sail to the part of the Indies they controlled 
at the Treaty of Munster. This Peace Treaty ended the Eighty Years’ War. Consequently, the Dutch 
Republic had obtained an exclusive right, following the Spanish renunciation on behalf of Philip IV’s 
citizens, on the basis of a right of conquest. The outcome of an armed conflict could put the rules of the 
initial state of nature, wherein navigation on the high seas was free, aside. Just as the state of nature 
between individuals did not know appropriation yet, the status of the high seas as the common heritage of 
men was a merely transitory one. The Dutch Republic could thus acquire the exclusive right to sail to the 
                                                          
78 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 11. 
79 Après quoi, il ne sauroit légitimement se plaindre, de ce qu’il n’a plus la liberté de disposer à sa fantaisie d’une chose qui lui 
appartenoit (sic) à l’exclusion de tous les autres. A plus forte raison, auroit-on mauvaise grâce que de vouloir revenir d’une Rénonciation, 
qui a pour objet des choses auxquelles auparavant on n’avait qu’un droit commun (BARBEYRAC, Défense, p. 4). 
80 Ad L. I. Dig. De Rer. Div. 
81 WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt, op. cit., p. 3; Andrea WEINDL, “Grotius's Mare Liberum in the Political 
Practice of Early-Modern Europe”, Grotiana XXX (2009), No. 1, p. 131-151. 
82 WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt, op. cit., p. 4. 
83 In the same sense, Grotius provided for a right of exclusion, distinct from full appropriation by the VOC 
(Martti KOSKENNIEMI, “International Law and the Emergence of Mercantile Capitalism: Grotius to Smith”, in 
Pierre-Marie DUPUY & Vincent CHETAIL (eds.), The Roots of International Law – Les fondements du droit international. Liber 
amicorum Peter Haggenmacher, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2014 (Legal History Library; 11/Studies in the History of 
International Law; 5; ed. Randall LESAFFER), p. 21.  
84 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 4. 
85 Ibid. 
86 WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt., op. cit., p. 22. 
87 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 5. 
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Indies for the VOC. Conversely, the Ostend Company could not unilaterally claim the same without right 
of conquest or sovereign (Dutch) consent concerning the King of Spain’s renunciation of his subjects’ 
right88. Erecting trade posts, fortifications or settlements on the Dutch’s East Asian shores, unilaterally 
claiming part of the VOC’s profit without consent, equalled restarting the military conflict between the 
States-General and the sovereign of the Southern Netherlands89.  
Positive law 
According to Barbeyrac, the Southern Netherlands’ treaty-based exclusion from navigation did not date 
back to 1648 or 1598, but to 1609, at the time of the Twelve Years’ Truce between Philip III, the 
Archdukes Albert of Austria (1559-1621) and the Infant Isabella of Spain (1566-1633), on the one hand 
and the Dutch Republic, on the other hand90. Initially, the treaty restored trade between North and South. 
Yet, this is immediately limited to the “Royaumes, Provinces, Pays & Seigneuries qu’il [Philip III] tient & possede 
en Europe91”. Trade outside of Europe was subject to royal approval. Barbeyrac and Westerveen92, 
however, read this as including the VOC’s (national) privilege of 1602, and applying only to inhabitants 
over whom the King of Spain still exerted control. In their view, in 1621, at the creation of the Dutch 
West India Company (WIC), the Southern Netherlands did not utter any protest. At the conclusion of the 
Truce, a declaration interpreting article IV as including Spanish territories outside Europe as well, had been 
accepted by Philip III’s delegates93. 
The Treaty of Munster brought Spanish recognition for both VOC and the WIC94. Philip IV renounced to 
all establishments in both Indies occupied by any of the Dutch companies, and extended their privileges 
to all Spanish possessions within Europe95. However, article V of the Treaty of Munster created difficulties 
for Barbeyrac. The Spanish negotiators had opted for the term Castillans or Espagnols to designate Philip 
IV’s subjects. Preparatory meetings and memoranda from both companies used the terms indistinctly for 
all subjects, argued both Westerveen96 and Barbeyrac: article VI relating to the West Indies mentioned all 
subjects of Philip’s Kingdoms and Provinces and should be read as an elaboration of the preceding 
article97.  
How could Philip have meant to exclude his non-Castillian subjects ? The Dutch Republic would have 
lost its advantage in contracting such a restricted commercial renunciation clause. Contracts ought to be 
interpreted according to party intent, and –following Cicero- the requirements of good faith push to 
                                                          
88 WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt, op.cit., p. 14: zodanige verschillen moeten afgedaan werden, na ’t eerste Volker-regt, 
volgens welk by na alles gemeen was, daar nogtans geleerden en ongeleerden beyde bekend is, dat door ’t regt, ’t geen nu plaats heeft, en by 
alle volkeren even zeer werd bewaard, veele dingen onderscheyden zyn, die in ouder tyd niet onderscheyden waaren. 
89 WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt, op.cit, p. 14, referring to the Dutch East Indies trade as the main reason 
for the end of the Twelve Years’ Truce. 
90 GARCÍA GARCÍA (ed.), Tiempo de Paces. La Pax Hispanica y la Tregua de los Doce Años, Madrid, Fundación 
Carlos de Amberes, 2010. 
91 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 7. 
92 WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt, op.cit., p. 6. 
93 Protest by the Deputies of the States-General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, Antwerp, 31 
March 1609, published in DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 80: les dits Sieurs Roy Tres-Chrestien, & de la Grande 
Bretagne [mediators for the truce] ci devant priés de la part des Estats de se vouloir rendre garants de l’observation dudit Commerce 
comme promis & accordé par les dits articles aussi valablement que si le mot des Indes y estoit exprimé ; Declaration by the King of 
Spain and the Archduke’s Deputies in favour of the States General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, 
Antwerp, 9 April 1609, DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 81. See as well Treaty of Guaranty concluded between 
Henry IV of France and James I of England, The Hague, 7 June 1609, DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 82-83. 
94 The WIC also published a memorandum against the Ostend Company, CUD, VIII /2, nr. XXIV, p. 78. 
95 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 9. 
96 In line with the VOC’s remonstrances to the States General, The Hague, 1723, DU MONT, La Vérité du 
fait, op. cit., p. 87-92. 
97 WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt, op.cit., p. 22.  
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recognize dubious words as creating obligations, rather than as discharging debtors from what is due to 
their creditor98. Eliminating all non-Castillian subjects of Philip IV would equal the exclusion of the 
inhabitants of the conquered parts of North Brabant and Flanders (Generaliteitslanden) on the Dutch side99. 
Taken together with Philip III’s restricted royal authorisation to his Castillian subjects to navigate and 
trade100, the inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands should be seen as excluded from participation in it. 
At the end of the sixteenth century, the Act of Cession (6 May 1598101) issued by Philip II to confer 
sovereignty over the Southern Netherlands to his daughter Isabella and her husband, Archduke Albert of 
Austria, did contain an explicit interdiction in its eighth article102, which was effectively applied on an 
Antwerp vessel sailing to the East Indies in 1600103. Westerveen further pointed to the Bastiaan Brouwer-
case, where a subject of Philip IV had sailed to Batavia in 1653. The local Dutch court, the Hooge Raad der 
Nederlandsche Indiën, had used article V of the Treaty of Munster to forbid the activities of this Spanish 
merchant. 
Imperial passports granted to individuals sending out vessels for the Ostend Company contained an 
interdiction clause, containing the African coasts, or other places où il n’est pas permis suivant les Traitez, aux 
Sujets de Sa Maj. Imper. & Cath. de commercer.  Following the VOC’s argumentation, Barbeyrac launched the 
obvious rhertorical question : Quels sont donc ces Traitez, si ce n’est celui de Munster & les derniers qui le 
confirment?104 Charles VI denied being under any limitation concerning the navigation of the high seas, and -
at the same time- confirmed the existence of positive law-limitations ! If looked closer at the Barrier 
Treaty, the instrument containing the precise conditions of the transfer to Charles VI, article XXII stated 
that the new sovereign would execute all obligations pending on Charles II, mainly concerning the military 
expenses paid by the Maritime Powers to chase the French and Spanish from the Southern Netherlands.  
Barbeyrac sees here an indication of the more general nature of Charles VI’s accession to the inheritance 
of Charles II, referring back to the general rule in the law of nations, according to which sovereigns 
generate obligations for themselves and their successors as well105. The analogy with civil law was obvious, 
with reference to the VOC’s initial memorandum: selon le Traité de Munster, mais aussi selon Droit par la nature 
même de la chose, sçavoir que celui, qui succede par Droit de Succession en la place du deffunt, est tenu, & engage d’observer, 
& d’executer tous les Traités & engagemens, que le defunt à (sic) fait, & contracté avec d’autres106. The more 
considerable the part received by the Emperor, the less likely he could be considered as a specific legatee. 
If, moreover, the Emperor was held answerable for the debts contracted by Charles II for the preservation 
of his part of the inheritance, it would be more likely to see the Austrian Habsburgs as general successors, 
                                                          
98 WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt, op.cit., p. 25. Which is the opposite of the normal rules of interpretation, 
restricting dubious words against the drafter. 
99 Since the Generaliteitslanden (Generality Lands; see ISRAEL, The Dutch Republic, op. cit., p. 297-300) did not 
form part of the seven provinces which seceded from the XVII Provinces, they were put under direct administration 
by the States-General in The Hague. 
100 An impression reinforced by the existence of the Casa de Contratacion in Seville, which served as a 
mandatory hub for foreign merchants trading with the Spanish West Indies (HUISMAN, La Belgique Commerciale, op. cit., 
p. 12). 
101 Georges MARTYN, “How ‘sovereign’ were the Southern Netherlands under the Archdukes?” in 
LESAFFER (ed.), The Twelve Years Truce (1609-1621), Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2014 (Studies in the History of 
International Law; 6), 2014, p. 196-209. 
102 l’Infante & Son Epoux ni aucun de Leurs Successeurs […] ne feront aucun Commerce, trafic, ou contractation dans les 
Indes Orientales, ou Occidentales, ni n’enverront dans ces Païs-là aucune sorte de batimens sous quelque titre, nom,, ou pretexte, que ce 
puisse être BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 6; DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 89 ; WESTERVEEN, Vertoog 
van het regt, op.cit., p. 7. 
103 WESTERVEEN, Vertoog van het regt, op.cit., p. 8. 
104 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 108. 
105 Memorandum VOC, DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 89. See as well G. Réal de Curban, La Science 
du gouvernement, t. 5: contenant le droit des gens, Qui traite  les  Ambassades;  de  la  Guerre;  des  Traités;  des  Titres;  des  
Prérogatives;  des  Prétentions,  &  des  Droits  respectifs  des Souverains, Paris, Les libraires associés, 1764, p. 620. 
106 Memorandum VOC, DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 89. 
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for benefits as well as burdens107. A sovereign bound to a treaty cannot lift his obligations arising from the 
latter by concluding another treaty contrary to it108. 
From the British side, commercial competition –in this case for the East India Company- was not the only 
argument used109. The anonymous pamphlet The Importance of the Ostend-Company consider’d, which appeared 
in London in 1726, had a double argument110. On the one hand, the “Netherlands” or Austrian 
Netherlands had proven their commercial genius in the past. The renaissance of Antwerp, Malines, 
Brussels, Oudenarde, Courtrai, Ghent or Bruges111 would put an end to a mere transitory episode since 
the separation of the XVII Provinces. As formerly, those countries would become the “staple of 
Europe”112, popish merchants returning to the South from the Dutch Republic113. On the other hand, the 
decline of Dutch commerce would inevitably lead to the demise of the state as such114, leaving Britain 
alone to uphold the balance of power between Protestants and “Popery”, more specifically the Catholic 
House of Austria115. Yet, the utility of religiously framed arguments was principally domestic. The 
diplomatic probability of a Catholic alliance between France, Spain and the Emperor was rather small, and 
remained so until the end of the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1738). French long-term geopolitical 
interest in dividing the Holy Roman Empire against the Habsburgs dominated.  
In Defence of Flanders and the Emperor: Neny and Du Mont 
Un droit de la nature & des gens, auquel [les bons & fideles Sujets] n’ont jamais renoncé. 
Remonstrance by the States of Brabant on the Ostend Company, 23 March 1724116 
Un droit primordial, qui autorise celle du Païs-Bas Autrichien à porter son Commerce aux Indes; […] ce droit […] n’est 
autre que le Droit Naturel, & des Gens. Droit aussi ancien que le Monde, dont l’étendue embrasse tout le circuit du Globe 
terrestre, dont l’evidence est au dessus de toute preuve, & la durée au de là de toute Prescription.  C’est ce droit, qui fait le 
Premier Titre de nos Belges Autrichiens. 
Jean Du Mont de Carels-kroon, La Vérité117 
Neny’s Demonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention118 was directed at the official VOC memorandum and 
its more elaborate version written by Westerveen. Neny positioned his pamphlet as restricted to the 
                                                          
107 Interests on debts due to the Dutch Republic amounted to 9,35% on average of the annual budget of the 
Southern Netherlands (Van Gelder, Tien jaar Trial-and-Error, p. 146). 
108 VATTEL, Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Book II,  §165. 
109 The Importance, 32. The British seized vessels as well, such as the Flandria off Bencoulen (British 
possession on Sumatra) on 9 August 1721 (Huisman, La Belgique commerciale, 195). British nationals operating from 
Ostend were seen as contravening to the East India Company’s monopoly. From a legal point of view, the British 
supported the Dutch claims based on either the Barrier Treaty, to which they were party, and the general guarantee 
obligation in the bilateral treaty of 6 February 1716, or the constant practice since Munster to exclude the Southern 
Netherlanders from trade (Ibid., p. 231). 
110 See as well, Anonymous (William Pulteney), Mr.  Forman’s  letter  to  the  Right  Honourable  William  Pulteney,  
Esw;  Shewing  how  Pernicious,  the  Imperial Company of Commerce and Navigation, lately established in the Austrian Netherlands, 
is likely to prove to Great Britain, as well as to Holland, London, Buffey, 1725. 
111 The Importance of the Ostend-Company consider’d, London, Say, 1726, p. 40. 
112 Ibid., p. 39. 
113 Ibid., p. 18, 19, 30. 
114 For it is, I Think, impossible to assign any other reasons for the Riches, Power, and Grandeur of the Phoenicians, 
Carthaginians, Athenians and Rhodians of old; and of the Hand Towns, Genoa, Venice, the Province of Holland &c. at this Day. 
(Ibid., p. 38). 
115 Ibid., p. 29. 
116 Remonstrances by the States of the Duchy of Brabant to Charles VI, on the subject of the Ostend 
Company, Brussels, 23 March 1724, CUD, VIII/2, nr. XXVI, p. 80-82 
117 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 23. 
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analysis of positive emanations of the law only, sans citations des Auteurs. The allegations of des Ecrivains mal 
appliquées had obscured the core of the dispute between North and South in such a way, that it had 
become unrecognisable. The Ostend Company’s fate ought to be decided as un cas de fait, qui n’admet pas des 
interpretations arbitraries, ni subtilités du Barreau119. The reaction to Barbeyrac did not come from a Southern 
Netherlander, but from Jean Du Mont de Carels-Kroon120, Imperial historiographer and author of the 
most impressive treaty compilation of the age, the Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens, later 
continued by Jean Rousset de Missy (1686-1762)121. Both Du Mont and Rousset were Huguenots122. 
Barbeyrac’s treatise consisted of 285 paragraphs in 131 pages, but Du Mont remarked it scantly answered 
the arguments of Neny123. His own treatise tried to formulate the Company’s case in a period of 
international tension between Charles VI and the Maritime Powers, which ended on 31 May 1727 with the 
Parisian Preliminaries of Peace, which signed the Company’s death sentence124. Karel Filips Pattijn (1687-
1773)’s treatise, which was distributed at the Congress of Soissons (1728-1730) following the 
Preliminaries, could not alter the participants’ views, even those of the Imperial representatives, who had 
buried the Company125. 
Free navigation on the high seas as a peremptory norm  
No private person could claim ownership or any exclusive right on the high seas, its use and the freedom 
of trade, “des choses incontestablement inprescriptibles126”. Neny found it striking that other nations could carry 
on their activities where the Ostend Company was active, without provoking Dutch anger127. How could 
the VOC argue that it had acquired an exclusive right in those parts of the East Indies sailed by other 
nations ? Wasn’t trade by its nature changeant & muable and thus inappropriate to lead to the acquisition of 
full dominium128 ? Even if the VOC and WIC existed for over a century, what did this change to the 
imprescriptible nature of free navigation on the high seas129 ? Next, according to Du Mont, couldn’t the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
118 Short version: Copy of the Memorandum presented to Prié on 22 October 1723 to serve as an answer to 
the Remonstrances of the VOC Directors, CUD, VIII/2, nr. XXVI, p. 82-85. 
119 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 3. 
120 HUISMAN, La Belgique commerciale¸ op. cit.,  p. 402. 
121 DHONDT, Balance of Power, op. cit., p. 18-26. 
122 Georg Friedrich VON MARTENS, “Recherches sur la vie et les écrits de Jean du Mont baron de 
Carelscroon, redacteur du Corps Universel Diplomatique du droit des gens”, in MARTENS, Supplément au recueil des 
principaux traités d’alliance, de paix, de trêve, de neutralité, de commerce, de limites, d’échange, etc., Göttingen, H. Dieterich, 1802, 
I, p. lxiv-xciv ; Graham C. GIBBS, “Some intellectual and political influences of the Huguenot Emigrés in the United 
Provinces c. 1680-1730”, in Bijdragen en Mededelingen tot de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden – The Low Countries History Review 
XC (1975), No. 2, p. 255-287 ; ID., “The role of the Dutch Republic as the intellectual entrepot of Europe in the 
seventeenth  and eighteenth centuries”, ibid LXXXVI (1971), No. 3, p. 323-350 ; Linda & Marsha FREY, “DUMONT, 
JEAN, BARON DE CARLSCROON (1667-1726)”, in L. & M. FREY (eds.), The Treaties of the War of the Spanish 
Succession : an Historical and Critical Dictionary, Westport (Conn.), Greenwood Press, 1995, p. 139 ; ISRAEL, Radical 
Enlightenment : Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750, Oxford, Oxford UP, 2001, p. 577 ; Stephan VEROSTA, 
“Droit international et droit interne chez Jean Dumont (1666-1727)”, in Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin, Paris, Pedone, 
1964, p. 479-487. 
123 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit. 
124 Art. I, Preliminary Articles concluded between Charles VI and the Allies of Hanover, Paris, 31 May 1727, 
CUD VIII/2, nr. LVII, p. 146-148. Strictly interpreted, the article only foresaw a seven-year suspension of the 
Company’s privilegium, vulgò (Octroy).   
125 L’Empereur n’a jamais prétendu tirer des thrésors des Païs-Bas autrichiens; et son intention n’est que de les garder pour le 
bien de la cause commune et de les conserver dans un état de défense, jugé nécessaire par le traité de Barrière, sans qu’il soit obligé, ny à 
surcharger pour cet effet ses fidels sujets, ny à employer les revenus de ses autres Païs héréditaires (Instructions for Kinsky and 
Fonseca, Austrian plenipotentiaries at the Soissons conference, February 1729, quoted in HUISMAN, La Belgique 
commerciale, op. cit., p. 446). 
126 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 21. 
127 Les Flamands et les Brabançons ne font leur Commerce aux Indes, que dans les Lieux où toutes les autres Nations 
trafiquent librement, & qu’il Leur est défendu par l’Octroy de S.M.I. & C. de le faire ailleurs. 
128 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 21. 
129 Ibid., 21. 
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Spanish and Portuguese, who had sailed the world seas for nearly a century without competition, have 
excluded the Dutch based on this argument130 ? What to think of French, British or Danish expeditions131 
? Moreover, if the Southern Netherlanders had abstained from sailing to the Indies, this was a 
consequence of the opulence which was theirs in the sixteenth century, before the Dutch Revolt: Mais pour 
peu qu’on fasse reflexion, à la richesse du Commerce dont ces Peuples étoient alors uniques Possesseurs, on comprendra 
aisement, qu’ils n’avoient pas sujet de porter envie à celui la. Ils regardoient les Castillans comme des Avanturiers, qui 
n’ayant que le Cape, & l’Epée, ne faisoient pas mal d’aller chercher fortune en ces Regions sauvages & eloignées132. 
The Treaty of Munster did not concern La Nation Belgique133 
Neny tried to distinguish two aspects of the Spanish Habsburg rulers of the Netherlands. On the one 
hand, he saw them continuing the Burgundian heritage, on the other hand, they wore the crown of Spain. 
In 1648, Philip IV would have ruled over the Spanish Netherlands as George I did in 1714 over 
Hanover134. Consequently, treaties contracted into as head of the Burgundian territories, could not bind 
Spanish subjects and vice versa. Barbeyrac refuted this distinction. First, Charles V inherited Brabant and 
Flanders from his grandmother Mary of Burgundy, and explicitly detached the Southern Netherlands from 
the Holy Roman Empire at the Transaction of Augsburg135 (26 June 1548). Consequently, Spain and the 
XVII Provinces had always been tied together. Seeing a distinct succession by Charles VI, as Archduke in 
Austria, King of Bohemia, King of Hungary, King of Sardinia, Duke of Milan and the other “Austrian” 
                                                          
130 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 13. 
131 Ibid., p. 23. 
132 Ibid., p. 18. 
133 Ibid., p. 17. 
134 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 5. 
135 The question was actually a matter of debate between Spain and the Austrian Habsburgs in the 17th 
century. The revenues in the Duchy of Brabant assigned to the contribution for the Imperial Chamber Court 
remained unpaid for several years, in spite of a condemnation by the Council of Brabant. Although the Circle of 
Burgundy remained a part of the Holy Roman Empire, calls for assistance by Spanish representatives at French 
invasions under Louis XIV remained unanswered as well. Neither side executed the obligations contained in the 
Transaction of Augsburg ! Leopold I (1640-1705) called for assistance of the Circle of Burgundy at Louis XIV’s 
aggression in 1683, but most of these troops were stuck in the parallel siege of Vienna. During the Nine Years’ War 
(1688-1697), requests from the Spanish Netherlands were subject to a discussion on the nature of their specific status 
as a Circle of the Empire. Was a financial contribution to the military forces of the Empire sufficient to be counted 
as a full member, or had the Spanish Netherlands been merely associated to the Empire in case of military peril ?  
In the preamble to the Treaty of the Grand Alliance (7 September 1701), Britain and the Dutch Republic 
had invoked the rights of the Holy Roman Empire to the Southern Netherlands, qualifying them as fiefs of the 
Empire, just as the Spanish domains in Italy (DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, p. 48). During the War of the Spanish 
Succession, the Empire counted the Southern Netherlands as contributors to the common military effort, but 
without any countervailing advantage. Joseph Clement of Bavaria, Bishop of Liège and Elector-Archbishop of 
Cologne, allowed French troops from the Southern Netherlands in his own fortresses, pretending they ought to be 
considered as troops of an Imperial circle. The Imperial court of Joseph I, however, preferred contingents from the 
Westphalian Circle and considered the Circle of Burgundy as not an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire. Max 
Emanuel of Bavaria did saw them as part of the Empire, but only in case he would rule over them as a sovereign as a 
compensation for the loss of Bavaria after the battle of Blenheim (1704), in order to keep his influence in Imperial 
politics. In the Wittelsbach’s view, Philip V’s accession to the Spanish throne was linked to the quality of ruler of the 
Southern Netherlands, automatically classifying his troops as  Imperial ones, sent out by an Imperial Circle. Joseph  I 
and Leopold I, however, firmly denied that Lorraine and the Southern Netherlands were ordinary members of the 
Holy Roman Empire. They served as mere keys and borders to the Empire, and could only count on the Emperor’s 
personal Rath und That (verbal and physical support).  See Émile DE BORCHGRAVE, Histoire des rapports de droit public 
qui existèrent entre les provinces belges et l’Empire d’Allemagne depuis le démembrement de la monarchie carolingienne jusqu’à 
l’incorporation de la Belgique à la République Française Bruxelles, Palais des Académies, 1871 (Mémoires de l’Académie 
Royale de Belgique; XXXVI), p. 292, 304, 313-314, 327-329 and 331. De Borchgrave finds support in Johann Jakob 
MOSER’s Teutsches Staatsrecht, Frankfurt/Leipzig, s.n., 1774, I, p. 317-319. The situation was not without relevance the 
British diplomacy in the multilateral game around the Company, since George I, as Elector of Hanover, could not be 
seen to commit aggression on a member of the Empire (Brendan SIMMS, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall 
of the First British Empire, London, Penguin, 2008, p. 193-194). 
16 
 
possessions on the one hand, and his dominions in the Southern Netherlands, as heir to the Dukes of 
Burgundy, on the other, was contrary to common sense. Charles VI received the Southern Netherlands as 
heir of part of Charles II’s composite monarchy, and not separately as the successor of the House of 
Burgundy, as Neny alleged on the basis of the Rastatt and Barrier Treaties136. For Neny, the mention of 
the union between the Austrian Netherlands and the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria within 
the Empire equalled the construction of the dominions of Maximilian I of Habsburg. Charles VI was 
nothing but a specific legatee in Charles II of Spain’s will. He could only have succeeded as a universal heir 
to the Spanish throne, if the latter document would have appointed him so. Instead, Charles II’s will, 
which designated Philip of Anjou as his successor, ruled out the possibility to appoint Charles of 
Habsburg as King of Spain. Neny further supported his claim by pointing to the distinction made in 
article II of the Barrier Treaty, which stipulated a link between sovereignty over any part of the Southern 
Netherlands, on the one hand, and the sovereignty over the Habsburg hereditary dominions in the Holy 
Roman Empire, on the other. The Barrier Treaty thus excluded a transfer of sovereignty to a French (or 
Wittelsbach, Farnese…) prince, linking the Southern Netherlands to the traditional Habsburg family137. 
Moreover, Neny contested that the conditions under which Charles VI obtained the Southern 
Netherlands, were of the same nature as those they were under during Charles II’s reign. In reality, the 
Barrier Treaty established an entirely new legal regime for the Southern Netherlands. Consequently, 
Charles ought to be seen as a specific legatee, and not as a universal heir. Thus, obligations and limitations 
of all kinds pending on the Spanish Netherlands before 1715 could not be applicable any more without 
explicit confirmation… and Charles VI’s royal consent138. 
Neny’s third argument was based on an alleged right of conquest on the basis of which Charles VI would 
have obtained the Southern Netherlands, allowing the Emperor to start with a clean sheet139. As far as the 
military events of the War of the Spanish Succession were concerned, Neny allowed himself a great deal 
of liberty. He had to reconcile two opposites: one the one hand, Charles VI needed the right of conquest 
in order to undo the existing limitations on his sovereignty in the Southern Netherlands. On the other 
hand, mainly British and Dutch-financed German troops had effectively conquered his new territories140. 
In his zeal to serve Charles VI’s cause, Neny obscured the substance of the Dutch assistance in beating the 
French in Flanders, and even accused them of lack of sincerity in their commitment to the general 
obligations foreseen by the Treaty of the Grand Alliance141. As a proof of this, the States-General allegedly 
refused to cede the Spanish residence in The Hague to Charles VI, despite strong instances by 
Sinzendorf142. This is without doubt the weakest part of Neny’s argumentation: Archduke Charles’ 
accession to the Imperial throne had been uneforeseen, after his brother Joseph I’s sudden decease. This 
course of events pushed Britain, not the Dutch Republic, to desert the Grand Alliance and agree to 
French proposals of peace, which had previously been refused by Imperial general Eugene of Savoy 
(1663-1736), the British commander Marlborough (1650-1722) and Heinsius, pensionary of Holland 
(1641-1722)143. As far as the war was concerned, the Dutch did fight by the Emperor’s side until the Battle 
of Denain (24 July 1712), whereas the Duke of Ormonde, commander of the British forces, had received 
his famous “restraining orders” from Whitehall (31 May 1712), where a peace-inclined Tory government 
                                                          
136 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 5. 
137 Ibid., p. 7. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid.: le droit de Conquête, qui l’exempte de toutes les obligations, conventions & contracts de quelque nature qu’ils soient, 
que les autres Possesseurs pourroient avoir fait, & par consequent les Sujets en demeurent aussi libres, & independants sous la 
Domination du nouveau Souverain Conquerant. 
140 Neny did not deny this, but found it nothing both a natural consequence of the Grand Alliance, for 
which no reward was due to them (NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 26). 
141 E.g. concerning the conquest of Italy, which was left to the Austrians. 
142 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 32.  
143 BÉLY, “Les larmes de M. de Torcy: la leçon diplomatique de l'échec, à propos des conférences de 
Gertruydenberg (mars-juillet 1710)”, Histoire, Économie & Société 1983, No. 3, p. 429-456. 
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was negotiating with Louis XIV. Neny further accused the Dutch of passive bribery. The city and citadel of 
Lille, the most formidable conquest of Louis XIV (1667), which had fallen in 1708, was returned to France 
at the Treaty of Utrecht. According to Neny, France and the Princess of Épinoy had paid the Dutch 
plenipotentiaries at Utrecht to return this important place in the Southern Netherlands to France, and thus 
take it from Charles VI, in whose name the town had been conquered144. The conclusion of the Peace at 
Utrecht without Imperial consent, finally, constituted a betrayal and a violation of article VIII of the Treaty 
of the Grand Alliance145. 
Barbeyrac, on the other hand, clung on to the possession of the Southern Netherlands in the 
same state Charles II had enjoyed it146. Accessorium sequitur principale: limitations contracted by Philip IV for 
the whole of his territories and still intact at the time of Charles II’s decease, did not disappear at Charles 
VI’s accession. Cela est fondé sur une règle incontestable du Droit des Gens, aussi bien que du Droit Civil147. Secondly, 
if Neny considered the Burgundian Netherlands as a separate entity, from Maximilian I to Charles VI, 
would this imply that all intervening acts of public law, such as the Augsburg Transaction or the Treaty of 
Munster, would not apply ? On ne sauroit se persuader, que Sa Majesté Impériale approuve cette maniére de plaider 
devant le Tribunal de toute l’Europe, & les contradictions où nos deux Avocats de la Compagnie d’Ostende font tomber leur 
Auguste Souverain148. 
In spite of his strong arguments on the general nature of Charles of Habsburg’s accession to the Southern 
Netherlands, Barbeyrac did in part misread Neny’s argument. The latter did not contend that the 
inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands were excluded from overseas trade at the time of the conclusion 
of the Treaty of Munster. Articles V and VI only concerned les Espagnols Castillans qui negocioient seuls aux 
Indes & y possedoient des Seigneuries, Villes, Forteresses, &c. In other words, there was no reason for Philip IV to 
present an extensive interpretation of the word “Castillans”, since his Spanish subjects were the only ones 
actually allowed to sail to the Indies149. Consequently, any bans on the liberty of his subjects in the 
Southern Netherlands were a purely domestic affair, and not guaranteed to the Dutch Republic as a treaty 
partner on the inter-sovereign level. Irrespective of the above-mentioned discussion on the nature of 
Charles VI’s succession (specific or universal legatee, answerable or not for debts and limitations imposed 
by the deceased), the international nature of the impediments imposed on the inhabitants of the Southern 
Netherlands can be seen as doubtful. Prohibitions such as that of 1598 decreed by Philip II or by Philip III 
in 1604150 were a domestic affair151, concerning the organisation of the composite Spanish monarchy, and 
thus not pertinent to the international and bilateral question between the Dutch Republic and the 
sovereign in the Southern Netherlands152. The latter had the competence to forbid, as well as to give his 
                                                          
144 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 31. 
145 Ibid. On this question, see Réal de Curban, Science du Gouvernement, V, p. 637 : alliance partners cannot –in 
this French author’s view- be unreasonably compelled to stick to their initial alliance, if the initial objective has been 
reached. Charles VI’s insistence on continuing the war with France could thus be seen as unreasonable, since he 
already had obtained the Spanish Netherlands, Milan, Sardinia and Naples.  
146 Art. I, Barrier Treaty.  
147 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 105. 
148 Ibid., p. 112. 
149 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 20. 
150 Restricting all trade with the Spanish Indies to Spaniards or Portuguese, excluding all foreigners, 
including his own non-Castillian subjects, such as Neapolitans, Aragonese or Sicilians (Historie of Tegenwoordige Staat 
van Alle Volkeren, Amsterdam, Isaak Tirion, 1738, X, p. 449; Memorandum VOC, DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, p. 88). 
151 HUISMAN (La Belgique commerciale, op. cit., 11) accessorily pointed to the granting of a general commercial 
concession in the East Indies to his subjects in the Spanish Netherlands by Philip IV in 1640, cancelling out the 
Transport’s eighth article (see as well letter from the Cardinal-Infant, Governor-General of  the Spanish Netherlands, 
to the Antwerp Magistrate, Brussels, 25 October 1640, DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 84: Sa Majesté […] pour 
beneficier les bons Fideles Sujets de par deça, Elle leur à fait ouverture du Commerce des Indes Orientales avec faculté d’y pouvoir entrer, 
ensemble à tous les Inhabitans du Septentrion, non obstant que cela n’ait été permis jusques aujourd’hui. 
152 Neny, Demonstration, p. 17. 
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subjects permission (“to bind as well as to unbind”: Ejus est solvere, cujus est ligare, cf. infra). Consequently, 
on instigation of the Count of Bergeyck (1644-1725)153, Charles II allowed the creation of a Compagnie 
Roiale des Pais-bas (7 June 1698) with the explicit competence to trade Aux Indes Orientales, & en la Guinée 
[…] Sans contrevenir aux Traitez de Paix que nous avons avec la France, l’Angleterre, les Provinces-Unies, & autres 
Princes, & Estats de l’Europe154. 
Du Mont, finally, reformulated the application ratione personae of article V in rhetorically appealing terms. 
First, the Spaniards or Castillians mentioned in article V of the Treaty of Munster, were the inhabitants of 
the Iberian peninsula who could trade with the Indies, not the inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands, 
excluded in 1598 by Philip II and afterwards by Philip III155. Thus, how could Philip IV have excluded 
them from a trade they were not involved in156 ? Secondly, the Treaty of Munster could not treat them as 
Spaniards, since they were only part of a composite monarchy: Les Peuples du Païs Bas Autrichien ne sont 
Espagnols ni par Nature, ni par Conquête, ni par Subjection, ni par Dependance, ni par Incorporation, ni  par aucune sort 
d’Union politique157. Finally, if “Spaniards” in article V had to be read as “subjects and inhabitants of the 
Southern Netherlands”, how could Barbeyrac or Westerveen explain the sentence stipulating that he 
inhabitants and subjects […] would keep their Navigation as they have it at present in the East Indies, without any further 
extension of it ?158 If only the Castillian subjects of Philip IV were allowed to sail to the East Indies, the 
interdiction of article V could not have been applicable to Aragonese, Neapolitans, Valencians, Catalans or 
any other people of the Spanish Monarchy. Consequently, Du Mont could present his European readers 
with a simple syllogism. The Spaniards in article V were those who had the right to sail to the East Indies, 
in 1648 (Maior). The inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands, even if we assume they were Spaniards, did 
not have the right to sail and trade there (Minor). Thus, the inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands were 
not included in the reservation Philip IV made towards the United Provinces (Conclusion)159. 
Cause theory 
Neny further argued that, even if the Treaty of Munster had  been applicable to the Southern Netherlands, 
the main motive for Philip IV to introduce a limitation on trade with the Indies, was that he could set one 
category of his subject apart, and favour another, i.e. the inhabitants of Spain itself. Charles VI, however, 
did not have this faculty, and was confronted with a purely comminatory clause, that was not any more 
counterbalanced by an advantage. Neny applied the causation theory from general contract law to the 
agreement between Philip IV and the Dutch Republic and concluded that the limitations imposed on 
Philip IV’s Belgian subjects were not any longer justified160.  
                                                          
153 DE SCHRYVER, Jan van Brouchoven graaf van Bergeyck 1644-1725 : een halve eeuw staatkunde in de Spaanse 
Nederlanden en in Europa, Brussel: Paleis der Academiën, 1965. 
154 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 18 ; DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 
85. 
155 Leaning on the conditionality of the donation of the Southern Netherlands by Philip II to Albert and 
Isabella, DU MONT (La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 30) argued that the archdukes’ childless existence had revoked the 
entire act, including the trade restrictions. Consequently, the only interdiction the Spanish Netherlands were under, 
in his view, was the internal one, imposed by Philip III, becoming applicable at the extinction of Philip II’s act. Qui ne 
sçait, que cette Donation ne subsiste plus ? Et quel Droit peut on tirer d’un Contract éteint, & fini, en vertu de ses propres Stipulations, 
il y a plus de cent ans ? 
156 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 29. 
157 Ibid., p. 28. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid., p. 29. 
160 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 15 argued that Charles II of Spain had obtained trading privileges 
for the Southern Netherlanders on an indirect basis. Negotiating trade argreements with Britain (23 May 1667 and in 
July 1670), Spanish diplomats had asked for the same trading advantages in the Indies as the Dutch had obtained. 
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Barbeyrac, again, saw this as an ungrateful attitude by Charles VI as an heir to part of the Spanish 
monarchy. Accepting the gains from an inheritance implied paying for the annexed debts as well161. 
Moreover, in the VOC’s argumentation, the Dutch Republic would never have consented in the Treaty of 
Munster without the exclusion of the Spanish Netherlands from the East India trade. In other words, the 
cause theory was used on the Dutch side as well. If Charles VI unilaterally removed the essential motive 
for the 1648 peace treaty, it would become void as a whole162. This had consequences for Munster’s 
confirmation in the Barrier Treaty as well: if the exclusion had been the core of the peace treaty, this could 
not have been ignored at the time of the 1714-1715 Antwerp conferences. 
However, the imbalance between gain and cost for Charles VI was striking. The Emperor started as 
sovereign with a clean sheet and new burdens incomparable to those put upon the Southern Netherlands 
under Charles II’s sovereignty. The Emperor acquired Tournay, but had to agree to the cession of several 
smaller entities in Flanders and Guelders to the States-General163. Not only the debts contracted before 
and during the War of the Spanish Succession, the closure of the Scheldt or the alleged limitations in trade 
with the Indies, but foremost the stationing of Barrier garrisons and the upkeep of considerable armed 
forces at his own expense164, had been alien to the previous regimes in the Southern Netherlands. The 
customs regime was tailor-made for the Dutch, who abused of the simultaneous Austro-Turkish war 
(1716-1718) in the Balkans to impose their tyrannique Domination in import and export duties165. Article 
XXVI of the Barrier Treaty, relative to trade, was strictly limited to the latter aspects and could not be 
extended to the Indies166. Moreover, the Dutch soldiers at Namur, Ypres, Menin, Tournay, Furnes or 
Termonde were exempt of import duties, which they abused to sell Dutch cheese, fish and butter to the 
local population, to the detriment of Belgian merchants167. During their administration of the greater part 
of the Southern-Netherlands (the so-called “Anglo-Dutch Condominium in Flanders and Brabant168), 
Neny judged the Dutch had extorted the population and corrupted public institutions169. 
Finally, Neny remarked with irony that the Dutch invocation of Alexander VI’s partition of the Indies in 
1494 between Spain and Portugal equalled recognising a state of affairs which all powers in Europe170, 
including the Dutch themselves, strongly challenged in the seventeenth century171. What else did the 
Republic try to impose in articles V and VI of the Treaty of Munster, than a partition of the world between 
two sovereigns ?  
The sovereignty of the Dutch Republic and the VOC, an usurpation ? 
                                                          
161 BARBEYRAC, Défense du droit, op. cit., p. 107 : qui refusoit de payer ses Dettes ; ou de se soûmettre à la Condition 
imposée ; sous prétexte que par là il ne retire pas de la Succession tout le profit qu’il en auroit autrement. 
162 VOC memorandum, DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 90. Supplementary, the violation of articles V 
and VI could be seen as rendering the whole treaty void, following Grotius, who prescribed the explicit mention of 
any incidental nullities (VATTEL, Le Droit des Gens, op. cit., Book II, §202). 
163 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 27-28. 
164 Art. XX, Barrier Treaty; Neny, Demonstration, p. 27. 
165 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 28. 
166 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 30, not applicable to trade between Charles VI’s subjects and other 
nations. 
167 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 30. 
168 Augustus Johannes VEENENDAAL sr., Het Engels-Nederlands condominium in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden tijdens 
de Spaanse successieoorlog 1706-1716, Utrecht, Kemink, 1945. 
169 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 26 : tant par les exactions rapineuses qu’Ils y ont 
pratiquées de toute maniere, que par la vente de plusieurs Emplois qui étoient vacants. 
170 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 13-15, pointing to Louis XIII’s defence against Spanish maritime 
hegemony, La Cour de France ayant jugé […] que son Droit de Navigation, de Commerce, d’Habitation, de Colonie, & de 
Conquêtes, par toute Mer, & par toute Terre; decouverte, & à découvrir, n’avoit pas besoin du consentement de l’Espagne.  
171 NENY, Démonstration de l’injuste et chimerique pretention, op. cit., p. 33. DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p.  
32 : Le Roy de France est bon Catholique, & il ne laisse pas de posseder de grandes & vastes Regions aux indes Occidentales, contre les 
Dispositions formelles de la Bulle. 
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In his closing remarks, Neny challenged the opponent’s very existence in public international law. Basing 
his reasoning on the mention of Emperor Rudolph II (1552-1612) on the donation by Philip II of the 
Southern Netherlands to Albert and Isabella, Neny equalled the omission of Emperor Ferdinand (1608-
1657) in the Treaty of Munster to a breach of Imperial law, leading to nullity. The States-General of the 
Dutch Republic lacked any Titre competent & legitime  to count as sovereigns, but were in reality mere Sujets 
& Vassaux de Sa Majesté Imperiale et Catholique, à qui Ils doivent obéir comme à Leur Souverain legitime172. 
Recognition by the elder branch of the House of Habsburg (that of Philip IV) was independent from that 
of the younger (Austrian), the Treaty of Munster between Spain and the Republic lacking the Emperor’s 
ratification concerning the Southern Netherlands, territories of the Empire173. The restitution of 
Maastricht and the illegal retention of ecclesiastical goods (art. XLIII, Treaty of Munster) were further signs 
of the implacable hatred of the Dutch Regents against their Southern neighbours174. If healthy 
competition from the Ostend Company drove prices down to more reasonable levels, to the common 
benefit of the Republic’s population, the Dutch trading companies were solely concerned with their 
shareholders’ interest, most of them not even residing in the Seven Provinces175. 
Du Mont respected the Treaty of Munster regarding the Republic’s recognition by Philip IV. However, he 
had trouble in conceiving the Heren XVII, or the VOC’s principal administrative organ, as exercising the 
organisation’s sovereign powers in Asia. How could these men be subjects of the Dutch Republic’s 
provinces, and, at the same time, wield sovereign power thousands of kilometres away ? The seizure of 
Ostend ships was mainly the work of the VOC, who represented in their own right to the States-General, 
and against whom Neny and du Mont had to argue176. 
Ejus est solvere, cujus est ligare: Charles VI could undo what Philip III had imposed 
In his 1726 memorandum, Du Mont de Carelskroon referred to the adagium ejus est solvere, cujus est ligare, 
& cui unum competit, eidem utique & alterum. This religious phrase was frequently used in canon law, and 
signifies that the authority conferred upon a person or institution to dissolve, or to pronounce sanctions, 
is indispensably linked to the capacity to found or to bring together177, since both are two sides of the 
same (contractual) medal178. E.g. a bishop cannot forgive an excommunicated individual without papal 
instruction, since only the pope has the competence to admit and exclude from the Church179. It is 
impossible to unilaterally quit a contractual relationship, if its existence was dependent on the other party’s 
                                                          
172 Ibid, p. 41. 
173 Ibid, p. 39. 
174 Ibid, p. 25. 
175 Ibid, p. 25. 
176 Il est inconcevable, qu’une Société de mille personnes au plus, qui sont Presque tous Bourgeois de quelque Ville de Holande, 
responsibles en leurs biens, & en leurs vies à sa Jurisdiction civile & criminelle du Magistrat, & qui ont pour Chefs, ou plûtôt pour 
premiers Administrateurs, dix sept Hommes, soumis comme eux à la Puissance Souveraine, & Municipale de la Province, & de la 
Ville, où ils habitent […] que ces mille Particuliers forment en Asie une Republique, formidable à tous les Princes de ces Regions là, à 
l’exception peut-être du Sophy, du Mogol, & des Rois de la Chine, & du Japon  (DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 36). On 
the VOC and its incipient stages in East Asia, see J. A. SOMERS, De VOC als volkenrechtelijke actor [SI-EUR], Gouda, 
Sanders, 2001. 
177 E.g. Pierre Toussaint DURAND DE MAILLANE, Dictionnaire de droit canonique et de pratique bénéficiale, conféré 
avec les maximes et la jurisprudence de France, Lyon, Benoît Duplain, 1770, p. 175 ; J. Pontas, Dictionnaire de cas de conscience 
ou decisions des plus considerables difficultez touchant la Morale & la Discipline Ecclésiastique, Paris , Le Mercier, 1726, p. 975 (a 
priest suspended by a sentence pronounced by an ecclesiastical court of law can only be absolved of it by the bishop 
or Metropolitan who is his hierarchical superior). 
178 François BABIN, Conférences ecclésiastiques du diocèse d’Angers, sur les censures, Anger/Paris , Dubé, Guerin, 
1767, p. 608 : l’ordination & le bénéfice qui y étoit toujours joint, formoient une espèce de contrat sinallagmatique, dont une des 
obligations de la part du clerc ordonné, étoit de demeurer fixe dans le poste qui lui étoit assigné. CE contrat passé avec l’église ne pouvoit 
se dissoudre que par l’évêque qui étoit son représentant ; c’est ce qui a donné lieu d’appliquer aux démissions des bénéfices, les maximes, 
ejus est solvere cujus est ligare ; illius est destituere cujus est instituere. 
179 Michel ANDRÉ, Cours alphabétique et méthodique de droit canon dans ses rapports avec le droit civil ecclésiastique, 
Paris, Boullotte, 1859, p. 286. 
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consent180. If the Treaty of Munster did not apply to the Southern Netherlands and Philip III did install an 
internal prohibition on his “Belgian” subjects, Charles VI, as his successor, could lift it again, just as 
Charles II had done when allowing for the creation of a Company in 1698. William III and the States-
General had not uttered a single reproach at that time. Consequently, the Dutch Republic had to abstain 
from intervention in these internal matters. Si cette Regle est bonne entre les particuliers, elle vaut à plus forte raison 
entre le Souverain, & son Peuple, & quand ces deux sont d’accord, les Etrangers n’ont rien à y revoir181. 
Multilateral diplomacy 
Il  me  paroit  que  c’est  une  affaire  désespérée;  ils  [the  plenipotentiaries  at  the  Soisson  Conference] avouent 
que le droit de Sa Majesté [Charles VI] est clair,  mais un droit de convenance qu’ils appellent, est entièrement en faveur de 
Leurs Hautes Puissances [States-General], et n’est d’aucune considération pour les sujets des Pays-Bas autrichiens. 
Karel Filips Pattijn to Visconti, Austrian representative in London, 1728182 
Rhetoric on the Ostend Company should not be framed as a mere bilateral dispute around the freedom of 
navigation on the high seas. Bilateral aspects of the Ostend Company-quarrel, as examined until now in 
this contribution, belong to a classical scheme of diplomatic and legal history183. Yet, our analysis could 
not be complete without the implication of Europe’s multilateral diplomatic system, as the words of Karel 
Filips Pattijn quoted above indicate184. The working of international relations is not a product of crude 
power configurations and political compromise. Implicit norms or habits shape the expression of the 
latter, and constitute the essential nexus between diplomatic history and academic attempts at 
systematisation through legal concepts185. Classical international law in scholarly treatises186 and political 
practice consolidated in preceding treaties187 were elements of a diplomatic culture, serving as building 
blocks for reasoning. 
Manuals such as those of Wicquefort188, Caillières189 or la Sarraz190 emphasized the intricate links between 
legal theory and diplomatic practice. Although the latter was considered as the sole and privileged way to 
                                                          
180 Encyclopédie méthodique, Paris/Liège, Panckoucke/Plomteux, 1783, III, “démission”, p. 609: l’ordination et le 
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181 DU MONT, La Vérité du fait, op. cit., p. 33. 
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183 DE PAUW, Mare Liberum, op. cit..  
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186 LESAFFER, “The Classical Law of Nations (1500-1800)”, in Alexander ORAKHELASHVILI (ed.), Research 
Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, Chelentham, Edward Elgar, 2011, p. 408-440, Jean-Mathieu 
MATTÉI, Histoire du droit de la guerre 1700-1819, Aix-en-Provence, PUAM, 2006 (Collection d’histoire du droit. Thèses 
et travaux). 
187 LESAFFER (ed.), Peace treaties and international law in European history: from the Late Middle Ages to World War 
One, New York, Cambridge UP, 2004. 
188  BÉLY, “L’ambassadeur et ses fonctions de Wicquefort”, in Alain Pekar LEMPEREUR & Aurélien 
COLSON (dir.), Négociations européennes d’Henri IV à l’Europe des 27, Paris, AC2Médias, 2008, p. 53-63 ; Heidrun 
KUGELER, “”Le parfait Ambassadeur“. Zur Theorie der Diplomatie im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen 
Frieden”, in  KUGELER, Christian SEPP & Georg WOLF (Hg.), Internationale Beziehungen in der Frühen Neuzeit. Ansätze 
und Perspektiven, Hamburg, LIT, 2006 (Wirklichkeit und Wahrnehmung in der Frühen Neuzeit ; Hrsg. von Winfried 
SCHULZE), p. 180-211 ; Jean ROUSSET DE MISSY, Mémoires  sur  le  rang  et  la  préséance  entre  les  souverains  de  l'Europe  
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access the inner workings of the international system, its conceptual language was asserted to be drenched 
in legal terms and the broader intellectual tradition of Roman and natural law. Primary legal documents, 
such as treaties, conventions, declarations or manifesto’s, were eagerly published in collections such as 
Abraham Friedrich Glafey’s update of the Theatrum Europaeum191 and the widespread Les Intérêts présens des 
puissances de l’Europe, a French adapted version by Jean Rousset de Missy192. Combined with memoranda 
and day-to-day correspondence in the vast French193 and British194 diplomatic archives, historians and 
jurists alike can unearth the practical legal culture of the “Trente Heureuses” following the Treaty of 
Utrecht, which have until now mostly been explained as a transitory parenthesis, the product of 
coincidental cordial relations between the main protagonists (Dubois, James Stanope, Fleury, Horatio 
Walpole195).  
The construction of the Anglo-French alliance 
Most of European diplomacy between 1717 and 1731 turned around the apportioning of the duchies of 
Parma, Piacenza and the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany196. The Emperor had obtained a dominating position 
on the Italian peninsula after the Utrecht treaties, following the confiscation of the Duchy of Milan in 
1700 and the conquest of Naples in 1707197. Previously, Spain did hold the upper hand in the Italian 
balance, as a result of Charles V’s military campaigns in the 16th century and the inheritance of his grand-
father, Ferdinand of Aragon. As the cards were redistributed during the War of the Spanish Succession, 
Britain had foreseen to install the Duke of Savoy as King of Sicily, as a counterweight198.  
The remaining Italian princes, however, feared Imperial pressure would lead to German 
domination. Duke Francesco Farnese of Parma-Piacenza (1678-1727), whose agent Alberoni had risen to 
Philip V of Spain’s royal favourite199, hoped for a return of the traditional Bourbon-Habsburg antagonism. 
If Spain’s new monarch reclaimed the position once held by the Spanish Habsburgs, Charles VI would 
have a fully-fledged opponent. A “Spanish Risorgimento” in the Mediterranean after Utrecht did not only 
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benefit Spain itself, but was welcomed by Italian rulers200. The children born from Philip V’s marriage with 
Elisabeth Farnese201 could thus be seen as Parmesan, as well as Bourbon princes. Their succession in the 
duchies of Parma and Piacenza, as well as in the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany, where the Medici-family faced 
extinction in the male line, would prevent an Imperial take-over of these fiefs of the Empire.  
France and Britain did intervene when Spain invaded first Sardinia and then Sicily, but were not averse to 
a more balanced distribution of power on the peninsula. When Philip V was forced to adhere to the 
clauses of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance in February 1720202, the solution imposed on him was not 
punitive. France and Britain imposed themselves as mediators, guaranteeing a strict observance of the 
partition of the Spanish composite monarchy agreed at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. In 
an ongoing permanent process of  negotiation, the diplomatic efforts deployed by the mediators 
continued the coercive work of their armies203. The States-General did pass a resolution in favour of 
accession to the Quadruple Alliance204. Yet, Amsterdam, worried about the fall in Dutch commerce with 
Spain since the death of Charles II, preferred to stay aloof from the alliance. Consequently, the Republic 
acted as medius in bello, able to trade with all contending partners alike205. 
Cambrai 
Amsterdam-induced abstention in the War of the Quadruple Alliance switched to active engagement once 
the Ostend Company was on the table. As the general picture of Dutch commercial activity turned grim, 
with diminishing returns from the Spanish dominions or the Levant, the East India markets were the 
prime asset of the Republic’s trade206.  The Dutch, party to, invoked this treaty to bring both Britain and 
France to military action. Charles VI’s decision to grant permission for the Ostend Company, published on 
28 July 1723207, constituted a casus foederis208. After his unsuccessful remonstrances, Pesters, usually based in 
Brussels, was sent to Hanover, George I’s Summer residence, to convince George I’s ministers that the 
Ostend affair fell within the perimeter of the bilateral Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Guarantee of 1716209 and, 
thus, required action. On 2 October 1723, a new anti-Ostend bill completed earlier decisions of 26 April, 
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punishing participation in the Company with confiscation, lifelong imprisonment or death. Townshend 
followed the Dutch resident’s point of view and suggested joint military action under the terms of the 
Triple Alliance210.  
However, Ostend did not amount to a casus belli for France. In the words of Antoine Pecquet sr., 
senior adviser to Morville (1686-1732), secretary of state for foreign affairs: Les puissances maritimes ont leurs 
raisons de parler ainsy, Elles ressentent déjà les effets de l’Etablissement de la Compagnie d’Ostende qui leur cause un 
notable prejudice ; mais a l’Egard de la France, il semble qu’elle doit considerer si pour elle un mal a venir, et peut etre tres 
eloigné doit l’engager dans une guerre où elle s’exposeroit à plus perdre qu’elle n’a à gagner211. Seen from Versailles, a 
slight tension between Charles VI and the Dutch Republic was preferable to a full-blown military 
conflict212.  
In January 1724, the Congress of Cambrai was finally set to start major discussions213. Ostend and the 
recognition of Charles VI’s Pragmatic Sanction were no core matters on the agenda, but were used in a 
reciprocal game of deterrence by Spain and the Imperial delegates Windischgrätz and Penterriedter, who 
happened to have been shareholders in the Company214. Dissatisfied with the slow advancement of the 
talks, the Spanish ambassador Pozzobueno215 presented a memorandum against the Ostend Company at 
George I’s court. This might seem surprising, as Spain had but scant interest in the affair of the East India 
trade. However, Spain’s first objective was to bring Charles VI to concessions at the Cambrai negotiating 
table. In that particular setting, France and Britain had an ambiguous role as both mediators (Treaty of the 
Quadruple Alliance, 1718) and allies of the King of Spain, the latter as the result of alliances posterior to 
the Quadruple Alliance itself (1721)216. A military conflict with Charles VI had been foreseen as a 
possibility217. For the Spanish, the lex posterior derogat priori-principle (recent treaties override older ones) 
had to play. The mediators, however, clung to the priority of the Utrecht settlement over incidental 
bilateral promises. 
Moreover, the Dutch attitude in 1718 had left the British plenipotentiaries at the conference 
sceptical: The Dutch would not enter into any engagements which were taking for the Publick Tranquillity of Europe; and 
yet pretended to make use of them whenever their Private Interests were concerned. By which they would share the advantage 
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Velázquez – Maison des Pays Ibériques, 1998 (Collection de la  Casa  de Velázquez;  64  -  Collection  de  la  Maison  
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Treaty between Louis XV, George I and Philip V, Madrid, 13 June 1721, CUD, VIII/2, nr. XV, p. 34-36. 
217 It is however interesting to note that Townshend insisted on a guarantee of non-invasion of the Austrian 
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without taking upon themselves any part of the risque or trouble for the future […] They might have acted for themselves in 
the affair of the East India Trade, and would then have been intitled to the best assistance their Friends could give them218. 
France and Britain insisted on the vagueness of promises made to Philip V, inter alia the restitution 
of Gibraltar, which was constitutionally impossible for George I219. Frustrated with the slow course of 
affairs, Spain tried to provoke a conflict between Charles VI and the mediators in other issues, such as the 
Ostend Company. The latter was not foreseen as part of the agenda in Cambrai. The congress was solely 
directed towards the final details of the Spanish Succession quarrel. The Imperial delegations could retort 
by bringing the recognition of Charles VI’s succession on the table and supported reprisals in case of 
British or Dutch depredations on the Ostend Company’s trade. This deadlock made the conference grind 
to a halt. 
Mare liberum, pactis apertum ! Cursing in the public coffee-house of Europe 
Les Couronnes de France & d’Espagne demeurent separées & désunies […] Leurs Majestez Royales prendront un soin 
sincere & feront leurs efforts, afin que rien ne donne atteinte à ce fondement du salut public, ni ne puisse l’ébranler 
 Art. VI, Treaty of Peace between Louis XIV and Queen Anne, Utrecht, 11 April 1713220 
As expounded previously (I.B), Neny and Dumont had challenged the contractual basis for the exclusion 
of Charles VI’s Belgian subjects. They lost the battle in doctrine, as e.g. Vattel copied Barbeyrac’s pro-
Dutch point of view concerning the alienability of the right to navigation on the high seas221. Diplomatic 
practice, however, added a legal performance that brought the very essence of treaty law to the front. If 
Westerveen and Barbeyrac founded the exclusion on a voluntary act by two sovereigns, they could hardly 
oppose a norm of the same value.  
On 30 April/1 May 1725, Charles VI and Philip V provoked what seemed a revolution in the European 
diplomatic system222. They had been bitter enemies.  At Cambrai, France and Britain got exasperated by 
their unwillingness to compromise. Whereas, in 1717, Charles VI had sent out corsairs from Ostend to 
cruise on Philip V’s vessels223, both men were all of a sudden reconciled, boosting the Ostend trade. 
Philip’s clandestine agent in Vienna, the Dutch “adventurer224” Johan Willem Ripperda (1682-1737), 
transmitted Elisabeth Farnese’s wrath with the disloyal behaviour of France. The Duke of Bourbon (1692-
1740), Prime Minister of the 14 year-old Louis XV after Orléans’ decease, had decided to cancel the 
projected marriage between the still minor infant Maria Anna Victoria (°1718) and his sovereign (°1710). 
Moreover, during the Cambrai talks, French and British mediators played out Spain and Austria against 
each other. Ripperda persuaded Eugene of Savoy and Sinzendorf to bury the war hatchet and jointly 
oppose the mediators. Coupled with a projected marriage between Don Carlos (°1716), son of Philip V 
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and Elisabeth Farnese, with an archduchess (one of Charles VI’s three daughters), the new alliance could 
dominate the continent225.  
The Commercial treaty reversed the prevailing legal logic and confirmed Charles’ Belgian subject’s right to 
navigation. Whereas Neny had argued that the liberty of the Southern Netherlanders rested on a pure 
application of peremptory natural law, the VOC had preferred stressing self-inflicted limitations on this 
right. Yet, the latter strand of argumentation came under pressure. If access to the high seas had been 
conditional on the absence of a bilaterally concluded renunciation by the ruling Spanish monarch in the 
17th century, the latter could cease to exist decades later, when his successor Philip V explicitly opened the 
Spanish Indies to merchants under Charles VI’s sovereignty. Spain could incur a separate bilateral liability 
to the Dutch Republic, if the Treaty of Munster was still operative, in the sense read by Barbeyrac and 
Westerveen. Yet, between the new ruler of the Southern Netherlands and the sovereign in the Spanish 
Indies, no impediment existed. 
The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation negotiated by Ripperda merits more attention than it has 
hitherto received226. Dutch arguments according to which the Spanish exclusion of Philip IV’s former 
subjects in the Southern Netherlands was a proof of the possibility to conventionally close navigation on 
the high seas, were completely shipwrecked, to sink to the bottom of the sea at dazzling speed. Philip V 
allowed the “Belgians” what had been taken away under his Habsburg predecessors. The Dutch East and 
West India Companies’ legal objections had been spectacularly emasculated: if a treaty could have closed 
the sea to Belgian entrepreneurs, it had now been opened at large by a new one227. 
In 47 articles, drafted by Du Mont228, Philip V conceded extensive privileges to the subjects of Charles VI 
operating on Spanish soil (art. XXI-XXIV)229, as well as to the Ostend trade. Unlimited access to the 
Spanish colonies (art. IV, Treaty of Alliance, art. II, IX and XIII, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation) 
shredded the commercial dominance obtained by Britain in the War of the Spanish Succession. Next to 
Philip’s renunciation to the French throne, Britain had imposed an annual so-called “permission vessel” 
sailing from Cadiz to the Spanish Americas, as well as the contract allotting the monopoly on the black 
slave trade,  the so-called Asiento de Negros230. Philip V took the liberty to modify the pecking order 
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between European trade partners (art. XLVII231), imposed at Utrecht, which equalled cursing in the public 
coffee-house of Europe. All factories and trade posts in the East Indies were recognized. Letters of 
reprisal against Spanish or Habsburg subjects cancelled, and seizures against common enemies projected 
(art. XLI-XLIII). Finally, the “Flemish” nations in Spain obtained their own extraterritorial jurisdiction (art. 
XXVII-XXX) and could count on a bilateral system of judiciary assistance and ambassadorial services for 
international successions, which guaranteed the transmission of family patrimony to individual merchants 
(art. XXXI-XXXII). 
The “Austro-Spanish commercial cartel” thus constructed not only threatened the geopolitical balance in 
Europe, but British and Dutch commercial primacy as well232.  In 1725-1726, the Ostend Company 
controlled half of European tea imports233. The alliance was drafted to the detriment of Spain in general. 
The projected marriage between Don Carlos and one of the Austrian Archduchesses was hypothetical, but 
annual payments amounting to 3 million florins to the court of Vienna were not234. Already in June 1725, 
protest against the treaty appeared in the Madrilene press235. 
The Republic had no other choice but to join the Alliance of Hanover (3 September 1725236). Not only to 
supress the Ostend Company. The combination of Spain and Austria was a potential geopolitical threat. 
Moreover, a conflict with them could escalate if Brandenburg-Prussia stepped in on the side of the 
Emperor, which would endanger the Republic’s eastern border237. 
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Conclusion 
The suppression of the Ostend Company became central to the Republic’s foreign policy in the 1720s. 
Pensioner Simon Slingelandt (1664-1736), in function from 1727 on, even convinced the City of 
Amsterdam to accept a rise in the verponding (real estate tax) pursuant to a recalculation of the land register, 
with the prospect of hard action against the competitor in the Southern Netherlands238. 
The managers of European international relations between 1713 and 1740 avoided the sudden eruption of 
a continent-wide military conflict239. In order to succeed in this objective, all pending bilateral issues had 
to be solved conformable to the power consensus imposed by arms during the War of the Spanish 
Succession and translated into legal language at the conclusion of the peace treaties. Bilateral 
argumentation, such as that of the VOC, could not intervene in the conclusion of a treaty between Philip 
V and Charles VI, opening trade in the Indies to the Ostend Company. Yet, one overarching principle was 
the touchstone of all European affairs: the upholding of the European balance. By tying the commercial 
treaty to a projected marriage between Don Carlos and an Austrian archduchess, Charles VI and Philip V 
had openly violated the balance of power. The latter was not a mere power configuration, but the 
expression of a system of legal hierarchy, delimitating the scope of any legal instrument. Between treaty 
law and constitutional law240, but between fundamental and secondary treaty norms as well. At the draft of 
the Ripperda treaties, the balance principle was invoked, but only to obscure its violation in the ensuing 
paragraphs241.  
At the Congress of Soissons (1728-1730), Horatio Walpole (1678-1757) and William Stanhope (1690-
1756), British plenipotentiaries, insisted on seeing the Ostend Company as an application of a more 
general reasoning242. As an accessorium to the general power distribution in Europe, its legal status fell under 
the 1713 Great Power consensus, which was still intact. The countervailing Dutch arguments, presented 
by Slingelandt243, according to which Philip V could not have opened access to the Spanish Indies without 
prior consultation of the Dutch Republic, with whom he had to respect the Treaty of Munster just as 
Charlres VI had, or without violation of the loix fondamentales de l’Espagne, forbidding access to and trade in 
the Indies for all foreign nations, were not relevant any more. Multilateral decision-making, implying 
Charles VI’s consent to drop the Company successively in 1727244 and 1731245, decided on its fate. Yet, 
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this process had not been arbitrary or induced by domestic preoccupations, but was the expression of an 
implicit legal logic in the structure of day-to-day diplomatic process.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
245 Art. V, Treaty of Alliance between Charles VI and George II, Vienna, 19 March 1731, Rousset, 
Supplément, II, nr. XLII, p. 288-291. 
